

guidelines. It is perhaps significant that in relation to a proposed bridge at Kingston, the initiative seems to have remained with a private group, presumably of U.S. citizens, and it is difficult to see how this could easily be converted into a public authority in accordance with the guidelines.

A further argument against individual bridge authorities is that the Province of Ontario is opposed to such arrangements. Of course, if the Federal Government wishes to handle international bridges on the basis of its exclusive jurisdiction, then Ontario objections to this arrangement could be ignored. However, as mentioned earlier, there are sound reasons for cooperation between the two levels of government in international bridge matters, and therefore some weight should be given to the Ontario view.

- 2) The second alternative is the establishment of an overall bridge authority.

It seems reasonable to assume, as mentioned earlier, that social as well as economic factors must be considered in relation to international bridges, and therefore all bridges cannot be expected to be economically viable. Since government is unlikely to want to provide subsidies in the case of uneconomic bridges, the simplest way of supporting them would appear to be to transfer funds from profitable bridge operations, and such cross-subsidization can be most easily achieved through the mechanism of an overall bridge authority with a central treasury operation, provided of course, that sufficient profitable bridges are under the control of the Authority. Such cross-subsidization can, of course, be criticized on the grounds that it can encourage careless planning or inefficient operation in individual cases, but this can be overcome by ensuring that the accounts of individual bridges are prepared separately and that detailed operation reports are submitted to an agency of government with supervisory