

At the same time, in spring 1989, the government did indicate its intention to proceed with a number of other projects, including: the acquisition of twelve new Mine Counter Measures Vessels (MCMVs); twenty-eight to forty-five shipborne helicopters to replace the *Sea King*; the *Tribal Class* (destroyers) update and Modernization Programme (TRUMP); the new frigate programme; and the North American Aerospace Defence Modernization Programme (NAADMPP). Programmes for an Air Defence Anti-Tank system (ADATs) and a heavy logistics vehicle acquisition were continued as planned.

The key question on the capital expenditure side is whether long-term naval construction plans, land forces acquisitions, air force requirements, and other capital items such as the purchase of plant and buildings, can be forged into a viable, phased programme that will provide Canada with the armed forces that it needs. In part, this depends on the size of the overall defence budget and on decisions about the weight to be given to capital expenditures on the one hand and Personnel, Operations and Maintenance (PO&M) costs on the other. But, also, it depends on the model for the armed forces that the Canadian government seeks to develop over the remainder of this decade; and on the types, numbers and costs of equipment that are acquired to make them viable and effective.

PART IV A NEW MODEL FOR THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES

At the present time, there is a persistent gap between the resources and the commitments of the Canadian armed forces, as well as a great deal of uncertainty about the international situation. Canadians are not sure about the future directions of the country's defence effort, or about the kinds of forces that might remain in Europe, contribute to new United Nations operations, or serve to uphold defence and sovereignty on this continent.