

Helping Eastern European countries and their reform goals is, in a sense, an easier question for the West. Moscow accepts the independence of the former and the fact that most have rejected Communism. Most need, and have requested, economic assistance from the West. We believe the West, led by the countries of the European Community, has, in general, responded wisely and correctly. Substantial economic help is being made available, linked, as it should be, to the progress made towards democratization and a market system. The EC is prepared to offer a form of association to these countries. If the status of a unified Germany vis-à-vis NATO, and of Soviet troops in East Germany (and of US and other NATO forces in West Germany) can soon be agreed, there is a good prospect that common European institutions may evolve by the end of the decade.

#### Expanding Bilateral Relations

Increasing and broadening bilateral relations with the USSR and Eastern Europe is also a means of buttressing the positive trends in the East. It means more contacts, more visits, more exchange programs and new opportunities.

#### Arms Control and Disarmament

Our analysis supports the conclusion that major progress in ending the military confrontation between East and West is a key factor in enabling Gorbachev to carry through his program of reform in the USSR. The negotiation of agreements providing for substantial reductions by both sides of nuclear and conventionally equipped armed forces stands high in the order of Soviet foreign policy priorities. The agreement reached by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1987 to eliminate intermediate-range nuclear missiles (INF) and its effective provisions for verification was a major step forward in building the climate of confidence necessary for the conclusion of more far-reaching agreements. The prospects are now good that agreements will be reached in 1990 between the United States and the Soviet Union on substantial reductions in strategic weapons and among the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries on a significant first-stage reduction of conventional forces and major weapons in Europe.

Given the potential instability inherent in the current situation, the common interests of both Gorbachev and the West require that agreements on the reduction of