

(iii) verification, to the extent possible and necessary, of the data contained in the statement by means of cross-examination of the certificates presented in support of the statement, at the receiver/supplier end. If so decided, the head of the inspection team shall take a decision as to which data are to be cross-examined, taking into account the nature of the data (i.e., volume of the shipment), the nature of the receiving/supplying facility and/or shipment (i.e., sale, export, delivery to a facility within the inspected State party) and the resulting verification effort.

(c) In case that no accountancy bigger than the significant quantity is detected by the material balance verification, no specific data of the inspected balance have to be included in the report, neither must the facility operator statement be included. The report will only mention the fact that a material balance verification was performed and that no diversion of a significant quantity of material was detected.

(d) In case that an amount of material bigger than a significant quantity cannot be accounted for, the head of the inspection team will request an explanation to resolve the anomaly by the facility operator. In that case, the amount of material unaccounted for has to be included in the report together with the explanation given by the facility operator. Before concluding the inspection with such a result, all efforts will be undertaken towards resolving the anomaly.

## 5. Approaches for suspected clandestine stockpiling of chemical weapons

### 5.1. Verification principles

(a) The verification principle to be applied is anomaly detection.

An anomaly is defined for the purpose of this type of inspection, to be the presence of chemical weapons, as defined under Article II of the Convention, i.e. the presence of:

- (i) toxic chemicals, including super-toxic lethal chemicals, other lethal chemicals, other harmful chemicals and their precursors, including key precursors [and key components of binary and/or multicomponent chemical systems for chemical weapons], except for such chemicals intended for purposes not prohibited by the Convention as long as the types and quantities involved are consistent with such purposes;