

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/RW/CRP.23

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SUMMARY

Answers to questions raised by the Federal Republic of Germany concerning the Swedish proposal for draft provisions prohibiting attacks on nuclear facilities contained in CD/RW/CRP.22

In document CD/RW/CRP.22 the Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany has posed some questions pertaining to the Swedish proposal for draft provisions prohibiting attacks on nuclear facilities as presented in document CD/RW/CRP.21. The following is an attempt to answer those questions. The numbers below correspond to those of the questions raised in CD/RW/CRP.22.

1. In past deliberations in the Committee on Radiological Weapons on the possibility of prohibiting attacks on nuclear facilities various criteria have been suggested concerning which types of facilities should be covered by such a prohibition. One such criterion has been the distinction between military and non-military facilities. However, discussions in the Committee has shown that such a distinction would be difficult to uphold and furthermore not very useful. Instead Sweden has chosen as the main criterion the facilities' potential to cause mass destruction to man if attacked in such a way that release or dissemination of radioactive material could occur. This has been the guiding principle when formulating Article II:b in the Swedish proposal. (More detailed explanations on how the calculations in this respect have been done is given in document CD/RW/CRP.27).

2. In order for the facilities (as specified in Article II:b) not to be attacked in accordance with the proposed provisions, however, some further and more detailed requirements have been deemed necessary. Thus, in Article III and in Annex III provisions are made for States Parties to provide detailed information on the facilities in question as well as for international on-site inspection. With these provisions an attempt has been made to meet the need for information and international control while at the same time facilitating the procedures by keeping them as simple as possible. Sweden is of the opinion that if a State Party is prepared to comply with these regulations the possible military or non-military nature of a nuclear reactor, spent fuel storage, reprocessing plant or waste deposit is not a question of major concern.