

Left-Bank Dniester areas of Moldova. Forces in the Trans-Dniester are pressing for separation from the Republic of Moldova. The CSCE mission has developed a proposal for an autonomous status for the Trans-Dniester region within the Republic of Moldova. To date, however, there has been little tangible progress in bringing the sides closer to a settlement. Canada headed this mission for its first six months and a Canadian diplomat currently serves with the mission.

Estonia

The mission's objective is to promote understanding and dialogue between the "communities" of Estonia, widely understood to mean the Estonian majority and the Russian minority. The key issue is monitoring the treatment accorded the Russophones, given their status as a "national minority." Although the mission does not have a mandate to oversee the withdrawal of Russian troops, the CSCE has made it clear to Russia that it should not use the situation of the Russian minority in Estonia as a pretext for delaying the withdrawal of its troops. The mission has six members. Canada has served on it.

Latvia

The objectives of the four-person mission in Latvia are similar to those of the Estonian mission, namely to advise local authorities and relevant organizations on matters such as citizenship. As in Estonia, the key issue is the status of the Russo-phone minority.

Tajikistan

Established by the CSCE in December, this mission will attempt to facilitate dialogue and confidence building between the various parties in conflict, and to promote respect for human rights, democracy and other CSCE norms and principles. The four-person mission is the first CSCE presence of its kind in Central Asia.

Sanctions Assistance Missions

Although not designed for conflict prevention, the CSCE has established sanctions assistance missions in Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Macedonia, Romania and Ukraine. These missions are mandated to advise host governments on the implementation of sanctions against the former Yugoslavia. Canada heads the mission in Macedonia. ■

Canada Hopes for Pragmatism in CTBT Negotiations

The following are excerpts from a speech by Ambassador Gerald Shannon to the Conference on Disarmament, delivered on January 25 in Geneva.

Mr. Chairman, the Conference on Disarmament once again has the opportunity to serve the global non-proliferation effort, this time by means of the negotiation of a universal, non-discriminatory and effectively verifiable comprehensive test ban treaty. A CTBT will provide an important element to the global security and non-proliferation architecture.

It is my hope that we will act with the utmost flexibility and pragmatism in order that a CTBT may soon become a reality. It is important, as we search for the parameters of the treaty, to bear in mind the expectation by the global community that we pursue our work expeditiously. We must avoid the temptation to become bogged down in needless procedural wrangles. As the 1995 Review Conference for the NPT approaches, we must remember that substantive progress towards a CTBT or, better, the conclusion of our work, will have an important salutary effect on the prospects for the indefinite extension of that Treaty.

A comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty is a long-standing Canadian objective. We welcomed the announcement last August by President Clinton which opened the way for negotiations to begin. All the nuclear-weapon states have indicated their support for a CTBT and this support was reflected in the resolution adopted by consensus at the 48th General Assembly last fall. Four of the five nuclear-weapon states are currently observing testing moratoria and it is important to our work that all five nuclear-weapon states continue not to test. If this is the case, the world will have seen its last nuclear test.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to outline the principles that will guide the Canadian delegation during the negotiation of a CTBT.

- The treaty should ban all nuclear explosive testing in all environments for all time.
- The treaty should be non-discriminatory and universal, that is, open to signature by all states.



Mr. Gerald Shannon, Canada's Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament.

- The verification regime should be international in character and have a baseline capacity to monitor compliance on a global basis using seismic methods of anomaly detection, reinforced by other systems and technologies, e.g., imagery and radionuclide sensing. These methods of verification would be supported, as required, by an on-site inspection process.
 - The International Seismic Monitoring System should receive standardized data from a network of existing and proposed seismic stations. Management and resource responsibilities will require resolution. In this regard, the work of the Group of Scientific Experts and the third global seismic exchange experiment will support our efforts in a practical and pragmatic fashion.
 - An independent, modestly staffed, international agency should be established to collect, analyze and distribute data and to conduct on-site inspections to determine if a violation of the treaty has occurred. It will be important to bear in mind the requirement that the system be cost-effective.
 - It is our view that the UN Security Council would determine the response of the international community as a whole in the event of a confirmed violation of the treaty.
- As for the structure of our work, I am grateful for the efforts of Ambassador