considered by what means it could be carried out; had ever reflected that, as against each trade, the interest of the consumer—that is, everybody outside the trade—is low wages; had ever seriously reflected whether he would, or would not like, an employer without a rival, who could make his own laws, who was impersonal and therefore pitiless, who would control all military force, and who would be compelled to put a summary check on idleness by giving the idle the lash!"

The Spectator probably puts the case too strongly in two respects. In the first place, we are inclined to think that it underestimates the amount of thought that is being given to such questions by the leaders of the workingmen. The idea of the State ownership of all natural sources of wealth, such as the land, mines, forests, etc., has unquestionably taken a very deep hold upon many of the most intelligent and thoughtful of the representatives of labor, and has received and is receiving an amount of discussion, both in private conversation and in the meetings of their organizations, which would perhaps be a surprise to the Spectator, were it made a matter of observation for a time. In the second place, the labor representative would probably maintain that the Spectator has forgotten the fact that, under the new order of things proposed, the State, the universal employer that is to be, is but another name for the people themselves—that, in other words, the people would become their own employers as well as their own capitalists. This is, however, by the way. Our present object is not to argue the matter for or against the theories of either the Socialists or the Radicals in the ranks of labor, but simply to call attention to some of the signs of the times which are worthy of more consideration than they have hitherto received from the leaders of opinion.

That we are on the eve of great political and social changes must be apparent to every student of current affairs. Nothing can be much more certain than that in the future, and that no distant future, the ideas of the working classes are to have much more influence upon public opinion and State legislation than hitherto. It is perhaps but fair to set over against the apparent "levity" of which the Spectator complains, the fact that those who advocate these revolutionary changes are well aware that they cannot be brought about all of a sudden. They know well that, like all other great changes, these so-called radical reforms, if wrought at all, can be wrought only by slow and gradual processes, and after protracted and exhaustive agitation. But, they would probably say, and not without great force, that the only way in which great reforms have ever been or ever can be wrought without violent revolution, is by the bold and decided advocacy of those who have faith in them. The man who fears to commit himself unequivocally and enthusiastically to any great radical, social, or political change will never accomplish anything of importance in the direction of that change. Its strongest advocates need have no fear that the forces of conservatism will be too soon overcome, or that the change will be brought into practical operation too suddenly. In a word, the only way to propagate great ideas and to effect great reforms is for those who believe in them to throw themselves without hesitation or reserve into the struggle. They may be well assured that there will be brakes enough on the wheel to prevent its gaining dangerous speed, especially seeing that its course must be an up-hill one in any case.

It is worse than folly for the leaders of thought in society and the State to ignore such facts and phenomena as those which called forth the Spectator's article. The seeds of these revolutionary ideas are in the air and are constantly dropping into soil, much of which is fruitful ground for them. If they are dangerous ideas, if they threaten destruction to the whole political and economical fabric, the greater the reason why they should be boldly challenged and confuted. Such events as the great mining strikes in England will do much to stimulate thought and discussion. The question of State ownership of the natural store-houses upon the contents of which the industrial and social well-being of the whole nation depends, is now being considered as never before. It cannot be denied that there is much in the theory of national ownership and control which is attractive to thoughtful minds. The main difficulties are moral ones. Must it be confessed that the nations as a whole are still so much under the influence of selfishness, greed and dishonesty that such theories must be scouted as visionary and absurd?

HAS THE PARLIAMENT OF CANADA CONSTITUENT POWERS?—II.

In a former paper I arrived at this conclusion, that the language of the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, is sufficiently wide to confer constituent powers upon our representative legislatures unless the B. N. A. Act of two years later date contains provisions inconsistent with the application to Canada of the earlier general provision. To keep the matter clearly before the reader I again quote the language of the earlier Act:

"Every representative legislature shall in respect to the Colony under its jurisdiction have and be deemed at all times to have had full power to make laws respecting the constitution, powers, and procedure of such legislature."

This provision applies of course to colonial legislatures to be thereafter established as well as to those already in operation. There must be a beginning to everything and the initial organization of the legislature with which a colony is to commence operations must necessarily be prescribed by an Imperial Act. The fact that express provision is thus made for this initial organization, even to details, affords no argument against the applicability of the Colonial Laws Validity Act, for *ex hypothesi* there must be the representative legislature duly established before the powers conferred by that Act can attach. What we have to ask therefore is: Does the B.N.A. Act make express provision, not as to the various details of our constitution, but as to the alteration of those details? Is anything said as to the making of laws respecting the constitution powers and procedure of our various legislatures, federal and provincial?

We have in this connection to apply the well established rule of interpretation expressed, as so many of our legal maxims are, in the Latin—*mentio unius exclusio est alterius*—the sound common sense of which must commend it to our acceptance. If the framers of the B.N.A. Act had intended that the legislative bodies to be established in Canada should have the power covered by the very wide words of the earlier Act, we should expect to find nothing said about this power in the B.N.A. Act. Upon the establisment of those bodies they as representative legislatures would be at once by virtue of the general provision of the Colonial Laws Validity Act, clothed with "full power to make laws respecting their constitution powers and procedure." But if on the contrary we find that the B.N.A. Act is not silent on the point, that our provincial legislatures are expressly empowered (sec. 92, s.s. 1) to make laws respecting the amendment from time to time of the provincial constitutions ("except as regards the office of Lieutenant-Governor") and that no similar provision is to be found conferring like power in respect to its constitution upon the federal parliament, we must conclude that the omission was intentional. This argument however, drawn from a comparison of the provisions made for the federal and provincial legislatures respectively, I leave for the present and confine myself now to those provisions which relate solely to the parliament of Canada. If we find that the parliament of Canada is expressly empowered to make laws respecting only certain parts of its constitution, and that it can legislate respecting its powers only in a limited fashion, the application of the above maxim leads almost irresistibly to the conclusion that it was not intended to confer the wide power specified in the earlier Act. Special permissive provisions would be entirely unnecessary if the general provision of the earlier Act were intended to apply. I say nothing as to procedure for to it very different considerations apply. Power to regulate its own procedure is one of those things "necessary to the proper exercise of the functions which it is intended to execute" and is therefore impliedly granted whenever a legislative body is established in a British colony by competent authority. Positive provisions must of course be obeyed and that ground avoided which is covered by restrictive clauses, but for the rest colonial legislatures have always had and exercised the power to regulate their own internal procedure. I shall therefore refer only to those provisions of the B.N.A. Act which relate to "powers" and "constitution."

The word "powers" in the Colonial Laws Validity Act has reference to powers other than legislative, such, for example, as the power to commit for contempt of the authority of the legislature, to compel the attendance of witnesses or the production of papers before