

## BORDEN NAVAL POLICY CONDEMNED

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part of the welfare of the Empire. Whatever men may say or whatever men may do, the destinies of Canada are absolutely and irrevocably bound up with the destinies of the Empire. On my knowledge as given to you, on my knowledge as possessed but which cannot be disclosed, in pursuance of the sacred trust of a privy councillor and the leader of the Government in my country, I ask Parliament to pass this vote."

These are the statements which the Minister of Trade and Commerce put in the mouth of the right hon. the Prime Minister, but they are not statements which the Prime Minister would make. The right hon. the Prime Minister did not make them. My hon. friend the Minister of Trade and Commerce, with all his agility and ability, in effect comes out, as I said before, flat-footed, and takes the ground that there is an emergency, and that this country is not only justified but bound to meet the conditions which at the present time.

There is one statement, however, to which I must refer before passing on, and that is as to the atmosphere which my hon. friend found when he was in London. Why, Sir, you can find an atmosphere in London that will satisfy the longings of any Imperialist at any time he cares to go there. If my hon. friend had gone there four or five years ago, he would have found the air permeated with the idea that the Liberal Government was being driven to destruction because they were trying to take taxation from the poor man and to put it on the rich. If my hon. friend the Minister of Trade and Commerce had gone to London in those days he would have come back and said: "This is not done, because it is in the atmosphere. But it was done, and, by Lloyd George's taxation, many millions of taxes, about which my hon. friend from Hastings (Mr. Northrup) spoke so gloomily last evening, were shifted from the shoulders of the poor, down-trodden labouring men, and placed, where they belong, on the shoulders of the rich; not to the extent that they should have been, I submit, but to some extent. I say that the atmosphere was furious with opposition to that scheme. I can imagine what my hon. friend would have found if he had associated with the members of the House of Lords at the time when Lloyd George's first budget was thrown out. I was in England when the Veto Bill was under discussion, and I found the atmosphere furious. Other members of this House were there, and they found the same atmosphere. It was not only furious, but electric with the feeling that the Liberal Government was going to be driven out of power and that the Tory party were going to come back to power. The idea of the House of Lords voluntarily voting away their right to legislate on one important subject, and especially on one which affected the right of taxation in respect to their properties as against the property of the poor, was not to be thought of. But Sir, the storm passed away and if my hon. friend had been in England one month later, in 1911, he would have found an entirely different atmosphere; for while the hon. the Minister of Trade and Commerce and myself were on the ocean, the House of Lords gave in and passed the Veto Bill with the result that the House of Lords practically ceases to have any power, if the Commons desire to have their way.

Then, again, if he had gone to England—yes, he was there when the great question of Home Rule was under discussion. There he found another atmosphere. He found there an atmosphere which said that rather than submit to home rule being forced upon the people of Ireland they would rebel. He found members of the House of Commons and of the House of Lords standing up in the north of Ireland and advocating open rebellion. He even found physical force; he found men who were drilling, who had been supplied with arms and ammunition, who were going to resist this measure to the death. When he had stayed there two or three months longer he found another atmosphere because he found that the great Unionist city of Londonderry, which, it was declared, would stand by the men who were going to disrupt the British Empire rather than submit to Home Rule, actually elected a supporter of Home Rule. He also found that the great province of Ulster was represented in Parliament by a majority of men who were in favour of Home Rule. Perhaps you will pardon me, Mr. Speaker, for digressing as I have

done on this question, as I felt that it was necessary to show with what agility they create these atmospheres on the other side. When my right hon. friend and his colleagues had left Ottawa they commenced to create an atmosphere in England and that atmosphere was a demand for a contribution of money or dreadnoughts. Thousands of pounds were spent in creating that atmosphere. That atmosphere was created by articles in the British papers, and by cables these articles and speeches across to this country. We found these first in the Montreal Star and then we found them sent broadcast all over the country to the Conservative papers from the greatest to the smallest. The atmosphere was created; when the right hon. gentleman got to England he found everything ready for him. He was at once taken up by the Unionist clubs, he was wine and dined, he was given to understand that the only thing that would do them any good would be a contribution and, in that frame of mind and under these conditions, he went to the Admiralty. The people of England are a pretty bright lot; they are not all la-de-das, they do not all wear a round pane of glass over one eye, they have got two eyes, they keep them open, they have been keeping them open for a long time and they are perfectly familiar with what the attitude of the Canadian Parliament was in 1909 because it is referred to in the memorandum. They knew what the attitude of the Conservative party was in 1910, they knew about the amendment which the right hon. leader of the Government had moved when he was leader of the Opposition, they knew the attitude of the Liberal party, they knew about the Naval Service Act which had been passed by the Canadian Parliament, they knew that the Liberal Government had been defeated in the election of 1911, they knew the attitude of the Nationalists, they knew that the Nationalist allies of the right hon. leader of the Government would never allow this country to inaugurate and support a Canadian navy, they knew, in as plain language as it could be stated to them, that the only thing that this Government could do was to make a contribution.

With all this knowledge before them, with the knowledge that the Conservative Government could not build warships, would not build warships, with the knowledge that the only thing that they would be allowed to do by their Nationalist allies was to make a contribution—with this knowledge and under these conditions, the right hon. gentleman and his colleagues go to the Admiralty and say: With these restrictions, stipulations and conditions, what can we do for you? I wonder if anybody is surprised at the answer which they received from the Admiralty. It would have been a surprise to me if they had received any other answer. The Admiralty discusses the matter purely from an academic standpoint. The Admiralty is not changing base very much from its position in 1909. I read last evening to the House what was the attitude of the Admiralty in the McKenna memorandum issued in July, 1909, before the conference was held. I wish to read it again to show what the attitude was at that time: "If the problem of Imperial defence were considered merely as a problem of naval strategy it would be found that the greatest output of strength for a given expenditure is obtained by the maintenance of a single navy with the concomitant unity of training and unity of command."

Then they go on to say that this might be satisfactory in one part of the Empire and not in another and therefore they discuss other methods and lines of action. When the right hon. the leader of the Government went to London in 1912 he said to the Admiralty: What can we do? It may be said that the position but it was just what the manager of a great corporation or of a great work would do. Suppose this Government create a commission, tell them to go on and construct a public work and ask them what they want; they want to do the thing in their own way, exactly as the Admiralty wanted to do it, but the Government point out to the commission that there are certain reasons why they cannot do this and that. Then the commission will be reasonable and will come round and say what should be done. It is precisely the same with the Admiralty. The Admiralty say: Now, we have our chance to get exactly what we want as the managing board of the Admiralty—not the British people. I do not believe that it is what the British Government want, and I will try to prove to you later on where

in I make that distinction. But it is what the lords of the Admiralty, who are simply looking at this question from the one standpoint, say. They say: Give us, not dreadnoughts to use in the British navy—you cannot find it in the document—but they say, and I want to quote their words exactly: "The Prime Minister of the Dominion having inquired in what form any immediate aid that Canada might give would be most effective, we have no hesitation in answering after a prolonged consideration of all the circumstances that it is desirable that such aid should include the provision of a certain number of the largest and strongest ships of war which science can build or money supply."

What else could they have said? The right hon. gentleman asks them: What can we do for you immediately? The Admiralty knew that we could not build ships in Canada immediately; the Admiralty never asked us to do it immediately but the right hon. gentleman asks: What can we do for you immediately and he gets the only answer that the Admiralty can give them. They say that you can contribute a number of battlehips. They could not give any other answer and had any other body of men been in their positions they would have given exactly the same answer. It is true that the Admiralty make an argument to convince the people of Canada that they should make this contribution. They give us a statement of the condition of the British and German navy at the present time. They state that the British navy will be in 1915 and what the condition of the German navy will be in 1915, but there is a most remarkable omission in this memorandum which I do not think has been alluded to before, and I propose to allude to it now. The most remarkable thing in this memorandum is that, while the British Admiralty tell the people of Canada in this memorandum what the German navy will be in 1920, they are absolutely silent as to what the British navy will be at that date. I do not know, there may be two reasons. I am inclined to take the latter of the two. The first reason would be that they want to induce Canada to do something more than they would do themselves. I think the true reason is that they do not want to expose to the world exactly what their plans are to be for the next eight years. They have not given out their plans, and even in this memorandum there is not one word as to what the conditions will be in 1920. All we have is the condition which will exist in Germany at the end of that year. I have given so far as I know every argument that has been or could have been put up in favour of this contribution.

I want now to take up the other side of the case for a few minutes, in reference to the question of emergency. Notwithstanding the lamentable statement made by my hon. friend from East Hastings (Mr. Northrup) last evening, we know that Great Britain is the banker of the world. We know that in the last five years the British have been able to reduce their national debt by about \$50,000,000 a year; and that they have been able to pay all the expenses of government and to carry on their naval programme to a greater extent than has any other nation in the world. We know that they have been able to do all this out of revenue, and they state publicly that they are going to continue to do this.

We know that the Lords of the Admiralty have no fear whatever as to the outcome of this naval question between Great Britain and Germany. On this side of the House we believe that no emergency exists. I think we have the facts and figures to prove it.

The hon. member for North Waterloo (Mr. Weichel) made some reference last evening to the statements Churchill when discussing the naval proposals in the British House of Commons on the 2nd of July last. That speech has also been referred to by a number of hon. members who have taken part in this debate. I have here a quotation, which to my mind is the pith of the whole matter. This was made after the German Naval Bill of 1912 was made public, and after the ministers from the Dominion of Canada had been to London, asking as to what they could do in the way of immediate assistance to the British navy. You will find it in the English Parliamentary Debates, Volume 41, July 22, 1912. After having discussed to some extent what the British proposed to do and what the German Naval Bill proposed to do, he uses these, to my mind, very common-sense suggestive words:

"Cool, steady, methodical preparation, prolonged over a succession of

years, can alone raise the margin of naval power. It is no use flinging millions of money about, on the impulse of the moment by a gesture of impatience, or in a mood of panic. Such a course only reveals your weakness and impatience. Those who clamour for sensational expenditure, who think that the kind of danger with which we are faced needs to be warded off or can be warded off in that way, are either ignorant themselves of naval conditions or take advantage of the ignorance of others."

Where can you find the whole pith of the matter boiled down in as few words and as appropriate words as these? He tells the British people: There is no need to get nervous over the matter; we have it well in hand; what is the use of flinging away millions of money? You fling away millions of money, the argument would be, in vessels which are not necessary; you increase the cost of upkeep and these vessels will become obsolete in a short time. Better take a cool course and meet the conditions as they arise. It seems to me that Winston Churchill had in his mind conditions which, neither the British people nor we knew; but which have come to light during the last two or three weeks. It is well known that prior to that time, Winston Churchill had gone to Germany and prior to that he had stated to the British public and to the world at large what Great Britain intended to do, that they intended to maintain the supremacy of the British navy upon the high seas. We find now that the statements made by Mr. Winston Churchill at that time were made with a knowledge, which was not possessed by the world at large; but which is now coming to light. I find it in a dispatch in one of our Ottawa papers on the 8th day of February, 1913, as follows:

"Naval Pact in Germany may end Armament Race—Significant Utterances of German Admiral Von Tirpitz in Addressing the Reichstag. Berlin, Feb. 8.—The Budget committee is now discussing the naval estimates for 1913. According to the semi-official Lokalanzeiger, Admiral Von Tirpitz informed the committee that a 'sensible agreement' between Great Britain and Germany with reference to the strength of the respective navies would be 'something to be welcomed.' If he has been accurately reported, his declaration is the first official admission from a responsible quarter that Germany considers an agreement of any kind with Britain as within the range of practical politics."

Admiral Von Tirpitz's statement before the Budget Committee regarding German and British naval strengths was equally remarkable, when he said that there need be no misgivings regarding the maintenance of such a standard of naval power between Britain and Germany."

My hon. friends opposite should consider that article. We find next a statement from the Vossische Zeitung a very prominent and important German paper:

"The Vossische Zeitung treats Tirpitz's statement as a formal announcement that an Anglo-German naval agreement has actually been reached. The Berliner Neueste Nachrichten, the organ of the German Navy League—"

That is the jingo element in Germany. They have a jingo element in Germany as well as in England and Canada.

"—states that Germany is on the verge of a 'decisive change in her entire naval policy,' and urges Parliament to weigh well whether it would not be better to retain 'freedom of action.'"

Like all other jingo elements, it is opposed to such a change. In the face of this, how can any member come to any other conclusion than that Winston Churchill knew what he was talking about when he counselled sane common sense and reasonable action in the British House of Commons on the 2nd of July, 1912?

Mr. BURNHAM: Is the hon. member in favour of an Imperial navy, and, if so, would it not be advisable to consult the other parts of the Empire before adopting any policy?

Mr. CARVELL: I will have great pleasure in answering the question later on, because I intend to discuss that branch of the subject. When my hon. friend asks me if I am in favour of an Imperial navy, I say that I am not certainly am. He would be a mean Briton or a mean Canadian who would not be in favour of an Imperial navy. I am in favour of more than that; I am in favour of a Canadian navy as well. My hon. friend's question is a very fair one, and I will answer it later on.

We have more evidence of this question. I find another strong, and to my mind unanswerable reason

why we should not proceed with this legislation at the present time, entirely apart from the reason put forth by my hon. friend from Assiniboia (Mr. Turriff). The British labouring people are not entirely asleep over these questions. They pay their share of the taxes, although not as much as they used to; but they feel that if some of this money, instead of being devoted to naval armaments, were devoted to greater old age pensions, greater insurance, and such things as would ameliorate the suffering among the poorer people of Great Britain, it would be a much better world in which to live. Therefore, they have views upon this subject. Everyone of them on the other side from Mr. Bonar Law and Mr. Asquith down to the ordinary labouring man, knows and feels that England is safe, that she is looking after her own interests and does not require any of the colonies to look after her affairs; and they know that they can trust their parliament and government to do what is necessary for the country's protection. One of the most impressive things that I have seen in this connection took place at a conference held in London, a meeting of the Independent Labour party, the Parliamentary Labour party, trades unions, trades councils and the Fabian Society. The delegates assembled represented two millions of Labour-Unionists of Great Britain. Think of it—a conference representing two millions of Labour-Unionists. And here is the statement made by the president in his opening address, he being not only president of the society but also a Labour member of Parliament:

"Mr. G. H. Roberts, the Labour member for Norwich, presided, and, in the course of his presidential address, made the following reference to Premier Borden's offer of battleships to the Mother Country:—"

"Much comment is evoked by Canada's offer to furnish this country with three battleships. Did the Dominion elect to build, man and maintain its own navy we would not interpose. But a gift which greatly adds to our annual expenditure is open to criticism. Accepting Government assurances that our defensive forces are sufficient and efficient, these three vessels must be in excess of requirements. Besides which giving the colonies representation on the Imperial Defence Committee is a departure fraught with such far-reaching consequences that it must be subjected to searching inquiry. In resisting unnecessary and provocative armaments, which squander wealth otherwise badly needed, we have the glorious consciousness that the future peace, happiness and well-being of the world's millions largely depend on our exertions."

I commend this particularly to my hon. friend from North Waterloo (Mr. Weichel). If this had been brought to his attention in time, I think he would have made it known in this House. I have given it here because it comes from a body of men such as I have described, who believe that the British Government is amply looking after their affairs, men such as those who for five hundred years have never failed, when the standard of Britain was in danger to pledge their lives for their country's security. These men say that such a contribution as ours is unnecessary. But I have more than that. I have an editorial from the London Daily News of February 8. Now, this is not ancient history but something of very recent date. I do not intend to read the whole article, it would take too much time. But I commend it to the very careful consideration of hon. gentlemen opposite. I hope the right hon. the leader of the Government himself will take the trouble to read the article, because there is more in it than I have seen in any article published on the naval question either in this country or across the water. The article discusses first the recent statement made by Admiral Von Tirpitz:

"Admiral Von Tirpitz speech, if we understand it, was not a whit less important than his colleague's."

One of his colleagues in the Reichstag.

"Referring to Mr. Churchill's speech on March 18, he said that as head of the German navy, he had no objection to Mr. Churchill's ratio between the English and German fleets of 16 to 10. This statement implies, firstly, a renewal of Germany's assertion that she does not desire to contest British supremacy on the seas; and, secondly, a quite new declaration that the ratio of 10 to 16 secures that object of self-defence which Germany has in view."

This is a Admiral Von Tirpitz, who, as I understand it, is in charge of the naval affairs of the German Government, stated publicly that he had no objection to take to Mr. Churchill's proposed ratio of sixteen to ten, that is, sixteen Brit-

discusses this to some extent, and finally we come to the Canadian end of it, and this is my justification for reading it here this afternoon:

"Clearly, if the standard of 16 to 10 is acceptable to Germany after having been formulated by Mr. Churchill, there is very powerful reason for remaining faithful to it. Are we doing so? Two circumstances suggest a doubt. There is firstly the complication of the Malay-Canadian battleship; there is secondly the report that our programme of construction in the current year will be larger than forecasted by Mr. Churchill last year. Upon the second circumstance, so long as it rests upon rumor, there is no need to dwell; but the first requires comment. Mr. Churchill has said that the Malay-Canadian battleships will be additional to the English programme; they must therefore increase the ratio to more than 16 to 10. We have repeatedly emphasized that so long as we have to man and maintain the colonial ships without any corresponding reduction of our own programme this Colonial assistance imposes an additional burden upon the British taxpayer. If in addition we drive Germany into enacting new navy laws, and revive a competition when it promises to stop, then it will be admitted that the policy of counting the Colonial ships added to the Imperial fleet as external to the British programme is a very costly one. The course indicated by prudence and wisdom is two-fold. We should discourage gifts to the British navy and encourage the dominions to build local navies. The German authorities, precisely because they announce their fleet as intended for defense, could not count the local navies of the dominions under local control as additions to the British navy or in any way increasing the potential danger to German security. German naval apprehensions must be wholly European, and the dominion navies are wholly extra-European. It follows, therefore, that Canada would be doing the best for herself and for this country and for the peace of the world if, instead of presenting three battleships to the British navy she followed the example of Australasia and developed a local navy of her own."

That is a statement, as I have said, which, in my judgment, should be considered very carefully by hon. members of this House. When a great newspaper like the London Daily News, which is not a provincial paper, but one of the great journals of the world, read, probably, by as many people as any other paper in Great Britain except possibly The Times, comes out and practically tells the Canadian Government that they are not helping but actually injuring the British Empire by the course they are taking, it is time that hon. gentlemen opposite should drop their jingles, get out of this atmosphere that they found in London, and come back to reason and common sense. It is time for them to drop this Bill, and as my hon. friend from Assiniboia (Mr. Turriff) said, redistribute the seats and, if they are bound to have a decision, let the people say what we are to do on this subject.

But we have more evidence. I have given only a small portion of it, and I will not give much more, for to do so would take up more of the time of this House than I should be justified in occupying. But I wish to give a little more. A great deal of jubilation on the other side occurred over the attitude of my hon. friend—and I do treat him as a friend—the hon. member for Sunbury and Queens (Mr. McLean), a gentleman with whom I have been associated in political matters for many years. That hon. gentleman took the course which he thought proper, and I do not intend to enter into any argument with him. But we are indebted to the hon. gentleman for a lot of facts which, if properly digested, present cogent reasons to this House why we should not go on with this proposition but should come back to sane common sense. The Admiralty memorandum was given to the present Government, I believe, at their earnest importunity; and I have a suspicion that they could not get what they wanted the first time and sent the Minister of Trade and Commerce (Mr. Foster) back to get it—the Minister of Trade and Commerce is the man, I think, it will be found who turned the trick. But they only discussed dreadnoughts in the Admiralty memorandum. They absolutely threw to the winds everything which had to do with the navy, except dreadnoughts, and they only compare the dreadnoughts of Britain up to 1915 with those of Germany up to 1920. I now intend, to present to the House a number of statistics submitted by one in whom hon. gentlemen, I know, have the most absolute confidence. (Continued on page seven.)