

trated means alone, that adequate or powerful effects can ever be produced; the application of this principle may I am persuaded with safety be left to your prudence and judgment, which will be guided by a knowledge of the country of which I must be totally deficient. It is only to such circumstances of joint co-operation or union of effort as may be necessary that I shall beg leave to call your attention.

Even in confining myself to this object, general principles are all that can be adverted to, detail is scarcely possible, and the attempt to enter into it might be dangerous, as it might tend to embarrass under circumstances which I could not foresee or which might take their course in a very different [manner] from what I might have thought they would.

If the Americans should turn their views to this Province, which is certainly most probable, as their operations must ultimately terminate in a siege, the exertions that will be required to bring forward the artillery and stores necessary for that purpose, may I think exhaust all their means and occupy their attention, so as to prevent their being able to give at the same time any great molestation to your Province. I shall on my part endeavour to form a corps sufficiently strong to show themselves before them in the frontiers. If you should be without apprehension for yourselves at the moment, the re-inforcing of this corps by some of the Militia of the Lower part of your Province might be extremely serviceable. This is not with any hopes of being able to defend the frontiers, the gaining of time by obliging the enemy to advance with caution and the checking them by partial strokes when the opportunity presents itself will be my sole object; in the end we shall be obliged to shut ourselves up in this place and it is then by collecting all the force that you can possibly spare and sending it into the upper parts of this Province, where I shall hope that it will be joined by considerable numbers of our Militia, it may do essential service towards our safety. With this view it should advance as far in the rear of the Besiegers as can be done with any regard to their own security; the object must be to act upon their communication, to cut off their convoys and to harass them with continual alarms. In this way, if nothing more can be done, time may be gained and that in our situation is everything. It may be a fine field for an officer of some talents and much activity to distinguish himself. If the enemy should be in sufficient strength to leave a corps at Montreal, that would be able to bar his advance in a direct line the frontier towards Lake Champlain and the line from thence to Albany will probably be open to his incursions and they must have magazines or depots in these parts, the destruction of which would be distressing to them. I do not know whether among the officers of the 41st Regiment there are any who served in the American War, but among your loyalists you must have many who know how little the American Militia is to be feared when briskly attacked and in particular how open they are at all times to night assaults, a species of attack which I would strongly recommend whenever the opportunity presents itself.

I understand that you have given directions for repairing and putting in the necessary order for service the armed vessels of the Lakes; the command of these waters may be of great importance, more particularly of Lake Ontario. I do not know what force the Americans may have on it, but it will be a proper precaution to keep the superiority if practicable.

I have still a subject to refer to, which requires the most serious consideration and which is strictly an object of concert, as it is indispensably necessary that one uniform system should govern our conduct. I mean in what regards the Indians. If a war takes place, they will not be idle. If we do not employ them, there cannot exist a moment's doubt that they will be employed against us and in that event it is not merely the immediate consequences of their hostility that we should have in contemplation, the chain of our annexion which has subsisted for so many years would be broken and very great difficulty would be found in restoring it. All our valuable commerce now carried on in the Indian country would be lost and it would be years before our traders could venture to the parts necessary to resume it. On all these considerations, but particularly in the perfect conviction that if they are not on our side they will be against us, I have no hesitation in saying that we must