

Letters to the Editor

before the US defence effort because it sacrificed much heavier proportion of its manhood in the two world wars and because, in any case, much of the US defence expenditure "is for arms and adventures that most Canadians deplore."

But, of course, Canada has been shirking its share of the collective defence burden. The White Paper openly admitted this. Professor Lyon might still believe that Canada can rank only above Iceland and Luxembourg in terms of the percentage of gross domestic product devoted to defence and continue to be taken seriously and have its contribution "cherished" by allies. Unfortunately nobody else, not even the Canadian government believes that anymore.

Professor Jockel and I intended our book to be controversial. We regret, but are not surprised, that Professor Lyon was so upset by its contents. It, after all, challenges years of stale thinking about Canadian defence policy.

Joel J. Sokolsky
Royal Military College of Canada
Kingston

Sir,

In reviewing *Canada and Collective Security: Odd Man Out (International Perspectives, May/June 1987)* Professor Peyton Lyon is, of course, entitled to express his views, even though, I believe, they are antiquated, often unproven and today thoroughly inadequate as a basis for making defence policy. But Professor Lyon is not entitled to slur by inference my co-author, Professor Joel J. Sokolsky. Professor Lyon writes in his review that "Professor Sokolsky is a Canadian who, before his return, studied and taught in Washington — perhaps too long." The implication of this nasty little remark is that Professor Sokolsky has become Americanized and that *Canada and Collective Security: Odd Man Out* reflects a Washington perspective.

As an American, I recognize the old trick, which has been featured far too prominently in the Cold War history of my country, of calling into question the patriotism of fellow citizens. Up until now I had always believed that — most fortunately — Canadians had by and large avoided such an approach in debates over their public policies.

The notion that our book reflects a Washington perspective is patently false. Much of what we advocate is anathema in US policymaking circles. We pointed out that Canada needs to devote more resources, especially maritime resources, to the protection of its sovereignty. We called for the allies to have a new understanding for Canada's special sovereignty concerns. Try selling that to the Pentagon! We argued for a pullout of Canadian forces from Germany and for an intensification of the Northern Flank commitments. Just ask the ever-cautious State Department for its reaction to such an idea!

That *Canada and Collective Security: Odd Man Out* has proved controversial is not surprising. It is deeply, even harshly, critical of Canadian defence policy and of the policies of the allies towards Canada. That it provokes debate is welcome. But let's keep the personal attacks out of it.

Joseph T. Jockel
St. Lawrence University
Canton, N.Y.

Sir,

In the article "Mr. Beatty's Dilemma" in the May/June 1987 issue, C.G. Gifford incorrectly characterizes the position of a "strategic studies expert" as trying to persuade the public that air launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) are designed to carry conventional warheads (p. 11). This is a misapprehension on Mr. Gifford's part and one which I thought had been clarified in a conversation last year. All persons working for the Strategic Studies program and indeed all persons who are fully aware of the facts of the cruise missile program, have stated that cruise missiles, ALCMs included, are designed to carry a variety of warheads — nuclear, conventional, chemical and reconnaissance. In the strategic role, those ALCMs aboard B-52s will in all probability be of the nuclear variety. Of course, the test versions of the ALCMs flown in Canada carry no warhead at all, using a dummy weight instead.

W. Harriet Critchley
Director
Strategic Studies Program
University of Calgary

Sir,

I read C.G. Gifford's article on how Canada can assure its proper defence while carrying out independent, non-nuclear policies ("Mr. Beatty's Dilemma," May/June 1987) with great interest. While I generally disagree with many of the ideas expressed in the piece, only one of these ideas really worries me.

Mr. Gifford cites a number of examples of military figures who, in his words, "refused to be a cog in a race to oblivion" by taking public stands against nuclear weapons in conflict with their national governments. He then calls for "career and political bravery" on the part of the military establishment in denouncing nuclear weapons. I feel that he, in essence, is calling for the politicization of the armed forces. While an idealistic goal like global and multilateral nuclear disarmament may serve as a noble, if naive, focus for such political activity, who protects us from military politicians if their ideas do *not* conform with those of the mainstream of society? Didn't Colonel North and Admiral Poindexter place their careers on the line for what they thought needed to be done to support the contras in Central America, even if it contravened US law? Or the French colonels in pre-independence Algeria? Or all the colonels and generals in charge of military dictatorships around the world who feel law, order and stability are more important than individual liberty and freedom of opinion and expression? Given the generally poor record of military politicians with regard to domestic issues like economic development and tolerance of non-violent dissent, why should they do any better dealing with foreign affairs questions?

In spite of the military's critical role in a democracy to defend and, if required, fight to protect, its values and practices, the military *must* be controlled by democratically elected officials. While the hierarchical, authoritarian nature of the military does prepare it to win battles and wars, it was *not* meant to deal with concerns of the majority, or even those of a vocal minority, in any issue.

Tony Prudori
Thunder Bay, Ont.