

employment," for the workhouse was not in the circumstances inhabited by the guardians and he did not serve under the master of the workhouse so as to disqualify him from voting. *Adams v. Ford* (1885) 16 Q.B.D. 289.

The claimants were labourers residing in cottages on the farms of their employers. They were permitted, but not required, to live in the cottages on the terms that they were to give up possession when their employment ceased, and were either charged a reduced rent or had the rent deducted from their wages. The rates were paid by the employers, and the names of the claimants appeared in the rate-book as occupiers. *Held*, that the facts shewed an occupation by the claimants not by virtue of service, but as householders. *Marsh v. Estcourt* (1889) 24 Q.B.D. 147.

A policeman had the exclusive occupation, by virtue of his service of a cubicle in a dormitory at a police barrack. The cubicle was separated from the rest of the dormitory, which contained a number of similar cubicles, by a partition seven feet high, but there was a space of five feet between the top of the partition and the ceiling. The policeman kept the key of his cubicle, and was entitled to lock it up at any time. *Held*, that the cubicle was not "part of a house separately occupied as a dwelling" within the Parliamentary and Municipal Registration Act, 1878, s. 5, and that the policeman was not entitled to the franchise in respect of it. *Barnett v. Hickmott* (1895) 1 Q.B. 691.

The appellant had by virtue of his service as a policeman the exclusive occupation of a cubicle in a dormitory at a police station. The cubicle was separated from the rest of the dormitory, which contained a number of similar cubicles, by wooden partitions which did not reach the ceiling. The atmosphere of the dormitory was common to all the cubicles, and a gas-light was shared by them in common. A lavatory and mess-room were provided for the policemen who occupied these cubicles in another part of the police station. The policemen occupying these cubicles were subject to the control of a superior officer, who had power to impose restrictions upon their use of the cubicles inconsistent with the rights which a person ordinarily exercises in respect of his own dwelling. *Held* (by Lord Esher, M.R. and Lopes, L.J., Rigby, L.J., dissenting), that the cubicles was not part of a house separately occupied as a dwelling within the meaning of the Parliamentary and Municipal Registration Act, 1878, s. 5, and that the appellant was therefore not entitled to the franchise in respect of it under the Representation of the People Act, 1884, s. 3. *Clutterbuck v. Taylor* (1896) 1 Q.B. 395.

The claimants were nuns residing at a convent in the town of E. Each of them occupied a separate bedroom, and was subject to the control of the Lady Superioress, who could at any time change the occupants from one room to another or arrange to have more than one occupant of a single room. She could refuse to allow a nun to receive a visitor in her room, demand admission to the room, and require the nun to give up the keys. The nuns took their meals together in the Refectory, and occupied in common other general rooms in the convent; they received no remuneration, and were under no contract of employment. The premises were vested in the Roman Catholic Bishop of Clogher, the parish priest, and the senior curate of E, all for the time being, upon trust for the benefit of the Roman Catholic inhabitants of E. The convent was governed by rules subject to the supreme authority of the Bishop. *Held*, that the nuns were not "inhabitant occupiers" of separate dwellings. *Semble*, the nuns did not occupy their rooms "by virtue of the office, service, or employment." *Bannon v. Hanrahan* (A.C.) (1900) 2 Ir. Rep. 455, (following the *Clutterbuck* case, *supra*). Fitzgibbon, L.J., said: "Unless I am bound by authority to decide contrary to my own opinion, I should be unable to hold that a Sister of Mercy has an office, service or employment within the meaning of this section. It would be an abuse of language to speak of her membership of a religious congregation as an earthly service or employment, and although it might be termed an office, there is, as far as I can see, no person under whom she serves. No doubt she is under authority—