

And so, as an alternative, we have fallen back on a regional basis for the collection of this community power; in the circumstances, an effective alternative through arrangements which include those states which are willing to accept firm commitments for collective action.

Above all, of course, there is NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This regional collective security as exemplified in NATO is based on two concepts—not one but two concepts—the first of which is the importance of local defence, and the second, the importance of retaliation, especially from the air, on enemy nerve centres from bases which may be far removed from attack. Both these concepts are, of course, essential to the effectiveness of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Mr. Dulles, himself, talking about this at a press conference the other day, and referring to the necessity for local defence, but also to its inadequacy in present circumstances, said:

With the Soviet-Chinese-Communist world—with its 800,000,000 people occupying a central location; with its vast land armies—it would be utterly impossible to have local defences all around that 20,000-mile orbit sufficient to stop any blow that might come at wherever they might choose to make it. So that you have got to find some way whereby that type of local ground defence can be supplemented.

And he went on:

Now that doesn't mean that you eliminate wholly, by any means, land forces—it means you do not necessarily make them your primary reliance because, as against the kind of danger which threatens, it is impossible to match your potential enemy at all points on a basis of man-for-man, gun-for-gun and tank-for-tank.

And so, local defence, while important, has to be supplemented by this other concept of retaliation. And yet, if we relied too much on that and depreciated the importance of local defence, that would be interpreted in many countries as meaning that some countries were expendable. And I doubt if we could maintain a coalition, even NATO, very long on that basis. Inevitably there would be a retreat to isolation. There would be a move towards what sometimes is called continental security, both in North America and—and this is sometimes forgotten—in Europe itself.

But security of this variety, continental security, is a delusion, because, and I think the house will agree with me, there can be no continental security without collective security. And there can be no collective security without collective arrangements for collective action. And no such action can be effective without close and continuous collective consultation. There are then, as I see it, two deterrents against war, and we

must be clear about them both. Certainly I believe we are clearer now about the importance, the significance, and indeed even the limitations of the deterrent of massive retaliation than we were a few weeks ago.

There has been a good deal of talk in the last week or two here, in the United States, and across the seas, about this new defence strategy, or new defence concept, that is sometimes referred to as the "new look". It was also referred to by the vice-president of the United States in his broadcast a couple of weeks ago as a "new course". On the other hand, it was described by President Eisenhower, in his press conference last week, as "no new doctrine at all."

Whether it is new or old it is extremely important. In the words of Mr. Dulles, it means "local defence reinforced by mobile deterrent power". It means refusal to be tied to any rigid strategy, to any fixed planning, and it gives the nations of the coalition, it is hoped, more freedom of manoeuvre.

This old, or new doctrine, whatever you wish to call it, was dealt with in considerable detail by the United States Secretary of State in his speech in New York on January 12. He confirmed his views on this strategy at his press conference on March 17 in Washington when he said, and I quote from his remarks as reported in the *New York Times*:

I have said that the capacity to retaliate powerfully and instantly is, in my opinion, the greatest deterrent, and that when you are faced with that kind of potential enemy, or with the assets that this potential enemy has, I believe that a deterrent of that sort is the most effective way there is of preventing a war.

So far as I am concerned I do not criticize the view that this kind of strategy is a valuable deterrent against aggression, and a shield for defence. In my speech in Washington last week I went out of my way to say that I did not criticize it as such because it might very well be the best deterrent against war at the present time. What I thought was important, however, was to clarify some of the ambiguities of this new strategy, and to make it as clear as possible to us all where we stood as friends and allies in relation to it.

Within the last few weeks some very important and reassuring clarifications have been made in Washington of what seemed to some of us to be obscurities. I believe that has been a good result. I know that personally I feel better after having heard some of these statements.

The sentence on which I concentrated my attention in Mr. Dulles' January speech, and it is a sentence which has become pretty well