

close with the delegations of the Commonwealth and of the United States. Here, if I may, I should like to pay a very sincere tribute to the work that the foreign secretary of the United Kingdom is doing at this conference. His contacts with what we may call the other side gave him, in a sense, a mediating position on occasions on those matters where mediation was possible, and he is playing that invaluable role, if I may say so, with wisdom, patience and skill.

The problem of Indo-China as we see it is two-fold. There is first the short-range problem, and that might in its turn be divided into two parts. The first part is how to bring the Indo-Chinese war to an end on terms with France, which has borne the heat and the burden of the day there at great sacrifice for many years now, and the associated states of Indo-China could accept. The second point, so far as the short-range problem is concerned is to work out international arrangements with a maximum of free Asian participation to guarantee any settlement that might be reached.

But there is also the long-range problem of how to build up a collective security system for South-east Asia, again with a maximum of free Asian participation, so that new aggression may be prevented and the peace maintained. The short-range problem was of course made more difficult by the character and developments of the war and that in turn tended to complicate, colour and at times almost give an atmosphere of crisis to the second and longer range objective. Crisis diplomacy, is at times in these days unavoidable, but it is not always the most effective agency for the solution of long-range problems. In the search for a solution to these problems one viewpoint emphasized that we should concentrate first on the immediate problem of the war, then work out arrangements to guarantee the armistice settlement and only afterwards deal with the bigger problem of collective security and the future. It was felt by those who held this view that the exigencies of the military situation, and they certainly existed, should not push those concerned into premature or ill-considered discussion of political or defence arrangements which would not have the solid foundation of general and wide support which was essential, and which would have given the communists an excuse to say that the Geneva conference had been sabotaged.

It was felt by this school of opinion that before attempting to organize security you must be sure that you know what you are going to organize, also that all the free countries of Southeast Asia should at least be invited to participate in the consideration of the problem, and finally that there should be reasonable assurance of agreement and unity at home in regard to the acceptance of the commitments which might be necessary.

That was one view, one approach to this problem. The other approach, the other viewpoint, argued that recent events had shown the necessity of not only making a just peace in Indo-China but of taking steps, even while the conference was going on, to show by readiness to consider arrangements for collective action that the pattern of communist aggression in Asia could not be