In the voting which took place on November 21, Resolution A/L 548 was approved by 73 votes in favour (Canada), to 47 against, with five abstentions. Resolution A/L 549 was defeated by 44 votes in favour (one less than in 1967) to 58 against, with 23 abstentions (Canada). Mr. Goyer, the Canadian representative, explained our votes in the following terms:

"The Canadian delegation, as in the past, will vote to consider this matter as an important question in terms of Article 18 of the Charter ....

"On the substance of the issue, we shall abstain as we have for the last two years. In our view, the representation of the People's Republic of China -- desirable and necessary as this is -- ought not to be brought about without taking into account those already represented in this Assembly. The Canadian position has been outlined in detail in this Assembly, and we see no need to repeat now the arguments advanced then.

"As to resolution A/L 550, which calls for the creation of a study committee to consider the question of Chinese representation, we do not feel able to give it our support this year as we have in the past. We shall, therefore, abstain. The votes on this proposal at the past two sessions of this Assembly make it clear, we believe, that this approach is not acceptable to most member states. Had it won the favour of the Assembly, it might possibly have provided an opportunity for progress on this issue, but it is now clear that we must look for some other approach."

## Indochina

Addressing the House of Commons on March 18, the Secretary of State for External Affairs summed up the Canadian Government's view of the Vietnam problem at that juncture in the following terms:

"There can be no differences of opinion about the urgency of the need to help bring this terrible ordeal to an end. We believe the only way to do so is through negotiations that are directed toward the establishment of a durable and stable settlement which both sides can accept and live with. The immediate problem continues to be what it has been for some time; it is as simple to formulate as it has proven difficult to solve in practice. It is the problem of how to get the negotiations started and how to establish a sufficient measure of confidence between the two sides to enable them to sit down together and start discussing the basic political issues at stake in Vietnam, instead of bringing their military weight to bear on them. This is the aspect of the problem to which the Government had directed the highest priority and urgency."

The prevailing impasse, to the resolution of which a number of past Canadian efforts had been directed, was at last broken when, on March 31,