

Finally, the most promising of options, and the one most susceptible to near-term success, would be to assist New Delhi and Islamabad in developing the kind of *confidence- and security-building measures* (CSBMs) that came into being during the long and nervous period of US-Soviet tension. CSBMs range in nature from the technical to the diplomatic, and include such elements as launch detection and early-warning systems; a more comprehensive "hot line" capability between heads of government, foreign ministers, defence headquarters and other organizations; the establishment of regular joint consultative mechanisms; the institution of a programme of exchanges, visits to nuclear facilities, verification overflights and surprise inspections; and any of a host of other initiatives designed to increase mutual trust and understanding. With the exception of the creation of early warning networks, these options are the least costly, the least intrusive of sovereignty, the least likely to elicit counter-demands for unlikely great power nuclear disarmament, and the most likely to generate near-term results. This is one area where the international community has indisputable experience, and it is likely that both states would be eager to put that experience to use. While it can be argued that Soviet-American examples are only so useful here, they are where the world's experience with nuclear CSBMs comes from. And as mentioned, the East-West stand-off does have some characteristics of that between India and Pakistan: short decision times, armed conventional clashes at least between proxies, ballistic missile issues, direct ideological/religious conflict, and the like.

A WAY FORWARD?

There are a number of strategic impediments to outside involvement in the India-Pakistan nuclear debate. The first is that regional security concerns are *real*. India and Pakistan remain locked in a real if periodic hot war in which India is unquestionably superior. China can remain a real threat to India. In short, before condemning either New Delhi or Islamabad, it would be appropriate to "walk a mile in their moccasins".

As previously mentioned, India is an enormous nation, the second most heavily populated in the world. India is also a struggling democracy, and Indians do not appreciate being lectured by other democracies with less pressing social problems. In order to "move" a nation the size of India, one needs either a very long lever (in terms of money, diplomatic power, or military power), or a very large fulcrum (in terms of the relative importance of the issue in the minds of the Indian populace). It is very difficult for external actors to find an incentive large enough to outweigh, in the minds of India's politicians, the opinions of a billion people. The only nation powerful enough to have a reasonable hope of so doing – the United States – is not sufficiently motivated by regional interest to risk serious involvement.²⁰

²⁰ Sumit Ganguly, "Arms Control in South Asia: History and Prospects", *Defence Analysis* 12(1) (April 1996), pp. 65-75.