

point where special inspections could be called whenever there is reason to believe that undeclared material exists and official explanations have not sufficiently clarified the matter. States might even invite the relevant inspectors when they are confident that the check will refute allegations and dispel doubts regarding their weapons programs. On the other hand, inspections are likely to be rejected in cases where they might uncover programs and activities inconsistent with the state's official declarations. In such cases, the matter should be immediately brought to the attention of the UN Security Council, to which the IAEA has direct access. Together, these two measures increase the prospects of detecting undeclared weapons programs, although the Iraqi and North Korean cases demonstrate the range of difficulties associated with reaching judgements of non-compliance in the absence of direct proof. In other words, despite recent initiatives, detecting violations of treaty commitments will remain difficult, as states have a myriad of options from which to choose to disguise and conceal programs which are judged to be political sensitive.

Turning specifically to the North Korean scenario as being played out at present, it is the right to conduct regular intrusive inspections of all nuclear facilities -- that lies at the heart of the current impasse between North Korea and the United Nations. Apparently suspecting that the North was not being entirely forthcoming in its statements regarding plutonium separation, the IAEA requested in February 1993 to conduct "special inspections" of two nuclear waste sites at Yongbyon, an undeclared nuclear complex about 100 km from Pyongyang. Rather than comply with the IAEA request, North Korea announced that it would withdraw from the NPT. Two rounds of US-North Korean negotiations, held in June and July 1993, failed to resolve the issue, although North Korea did announce that it would suspend its withdrawal from the NPT as long as the talks continued. In January 1994, an interim solution was reached, with the North agreeing to allow partial inspections of its nuclear facilities, occurred in February, albeit under rigidly controlled circumstances. By late March, the issue remained unresolved, as the IAEA announced that the permitted inspections had been unacceptable. At the time of writing, following the visit by former President Carter to North Korea, there is the possibility of a meeting of the leaders of the two Koreas in mid-summer 1994.

Although there is no consensus on the extent to which the IAEA/UNSCOM experience in Iraq has set a precedent for future verification regimes in situation such as North Korea, there is a growing feeling among Analysts that the lessons learned from Iraq must not be forgotten.

#### BILATERAL VERIFICATION

The legitimate requirements for on-going monitoring and verification on a bilateral basis are even more complicated and far-reaching than for the multilateral situation described above. Bilateral monitoring will include not only the field of weapons