

political circumstances of crisis (one month of tension, one week of escalating threats, etc.) greatly influence survivability. In sum, it is not possible to incorporate such calculations without identifying detailed and complex scenarios.

In regard to the calculations made above, however, the summary conclusion is that the deployment of the MX missile to the number currently under discussion would not give the United States a counter-force capability, but if the number deployed increased to around 100, then the survivability of Soviet ICBM's is severely reduced.

Furthermore, the deployment of the Trident D-5 will bring the United States much closer to a disarming counter-force capability, assuming no change in present Soviet force deployments.

Of course, at this point in the analysis this last assumption must be qualified, since these last calculations anticipate imminent American deployments without counter-acting Soviet deployments. There is not enough information at the moment to fully assess the effect of the Soviet SS-24 and SS-25. As counter-force weapons, they are not likely to improve on the performance of the SS-18²⁵, but their deployment in a mobile mode, as indicated below, complicates the counter-force calculation.

Analysing the vulnerability of mobile missiles involves a set of technical calculations which are not, as such, set out in this paper. Nevertheless, the vulnerability of the mobile missile can be set out in general terms.

Mobile missiles are necessarily limited to a finite area (much more so in

²⁵ See for example, Michael R. Gordon "CIA Downgrades Estimate of Soviet SS-19" National Journal July 20, 1985, p. 1693. In regard to the SS-24, Gordon comments: "...Administration experts say that - based on the observation of tests conducted so far - the SS-24 has not yet achieved the accuracy of the SS-18, and judging from the size of its warheads it will not have the combination of accuracy and yield necessary for a high-confidence first-strike capability."