

The use of geographic criteria for recruitment is also an issue. The professional staff of the Agency is overwhelmingly Northern and developed state in origin. The Agency explicitly subordinates geographic criteria to technical competence, and seems very largely to have succeeded in preserving this ordering as compared to other organizations. While there is a form of quota system, it seems to be applied only loosely. Third World pressures to increase their states' representation have been resisted with some success by other states, who are fearful of any decline in the technical competence of the Agency personnel. If geographic criteria were given greater weight, the Agency would have to strengthen its training program for safeguards personnel, but even then some deterioration would be likely.

Confidentiality and Transparency

The IAEA must meet potentially contradictory demands in its handling of the information acquired in its safeguards activities. It must observe limits on the information it seeks and on the handling of that information both internally and in its public statements, yet it must also provide sufficient information, including information on its own activities, to help maintain the credibility of its assurances. A chemical weapons verification agency would face similar general demands. Some aspects of the Agency's information practices, therefore, could profitably be examined.

Problems do arise in the handling of information in the safeguards process, but preservation of confidentiality does not seem to be a great difficulty. The Agency is specifically directed in INFCIRC/153 to seek only the minimum information needed to carry out its functions. This is reflected in the controls over its access to design information (it can review this information, but possibly only on state premises), and in the adoption of safeguards techniques. These permit states and plant operators to protect sensitive information. As safeguards are applied to individual facilities through supplementary arrangements and facility attachments, and through the information requirements for state systems of accounting and control, these various information restrictions are given specific operational forms.

Similar restrictions would probably occur in inspections of chemical industry facilities. It could be worth examining the detailed information requirements for this application as compared to the nuclear area, to see if they were comparable or if additional problems would arise in the chemical area. Given the problems that bulk facilities present for Agency safeguards, it might be worth considering the information requirements and implications of a greater use of containment and surveillance or other approaches. If the verification agency was intended to monitor more than just industry facilities, other indicators, monitoring activities and approaches would be required, and these could raise delicate issues in information acquisition and management.