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the objectives of the inspection team and the timing of its visit, which of course would not be the case for actual inspections. However, no actions were accomplished in direct reaction to the team's visit to the facility. The inspection proper began with a meeting in which the team members and the facility management participated. Instruction was provided in accident protection. Then the inspection team was divided into four subgroups: a subgroup to study documentation, a subgroup to inspect buildings and structures, a subgroup to monitor means of transport and the facility perimeter; and a subgroup to work with the facility staff.

The principal focus of attention during the inspection was proper balance between the task of ensuring effective verification and that of safeguarding confidential information. The inspection team endeavoured to refrain from gathering information unrelated to chemical weapons. Nevertheless, a large amount of such information concerning the depot came to the notice of the inspectors. The inspection team visited 10 per cent of the installations located within the depot. However, that did not adversely affect the effectiveness of the inspection. In the first place all the types of buildings and structures were visited on a selective basis at the discretion of the members of the team. Secondly, although the facility management had designated the most sensitive areas which, it felt, had no connection with chemical weapons, the inspection team did not find the alternative measures proposed by the management sufficiently persuasive and visited those areas.

In selecting specific areas to be visited, the inspectors took into account such factors as the presence of air purification systems in storage areas, the presence of protective gear and decontamination equipment in and immediately next to storage areas, the presence of specially protected sectors, the absence of data on individual storage areas or other subdivisions of the facility within the overall system of documentation, separate record-keeping for individual subdivisions, or cases where items had been removed from storage areas immediately prior to the arrival of the inspection team, which came to light as a result of examination of the documentation and interviews with the facility staff. In this exercise the inspection team began its work with the least intrusive verification methods. The principle of "managed access" also governed the interviews with the facility staff. In the course of the interviews the representatives of the management who were present were able to reject those questions which, in their opinion, went beyond the purposes of the inspection, but if the members of the inspection team considered that a question was important, the situation was resolved between the leader of the inspection team and the facility director.

As a result of the trial inspection, the inspection team confirmed that there were no chemical weapons at the facility. It should be pointed out, however, that the steps and measures taken during the inspection proved to be sufficient to a large extent because the members of the inspection team were familiar with the designations of types of Soviet chemical weapons, and were thus able to dispense with the need to open the munitions in order to determine the types of charge used.