

tank weapons and ammunition, and so on). The same is true of arms transfers between Grenada and other communist states.⁹³ Grenadian military planning called for the creation of an armed force of some 4 regular and 14 reserve battalions, a force much larger than any known hitherto in the region. The Soviet and allied military assistance programmes together would have permitted substantial progress towards this objective. In this sense, the Grenadian military build-up constituted a potentially significant threat to other island states and was so seen by political figures such as Eugenia Charles of Dominica.

This suggests, superficially, offensive intent on the part of Grenada. But the principal perceived threat to Grenadian security (a perception which, it turned out, was not altogether unreasonable) was the major military power in the region, the United States. Seen in this context, the Grenadian build-up does not appear disproportionate to the requirements of regime and national security.

Moreover, there is a little evidence in the captured documents to suggest that the Grenadians, in conjunction with the Soviet Union and Cuba, contemplated the use of the weapons for the "export of revolution". Indeed, the documents display considerable awareness on the part of the leadership that actions of this sort carried a substantial risk of US counteraction. The limited interest, displayed in the documents, in the stimulation of instability elsewhere, appears to have been motivated not so much out of a principled commitment to the export of revolution as it was by the desire to prove Grenada's utility to the Soviet Union and thereby to enhance the Soviet perception of Grenada's international significance. Finally, one must ask how these designs, even if they were serious, would have been implemented, as the Soviet Union and its allies failed to transfer to Grenada the transport and logistical capabilities necessary to carry them out. The Soviet Union displayed restraint not just in the categories of weapons transferred, but in their apparent failure to seek substantial military facilities in Grenada.

In ideological terms, while their apparent recognition of the socialist character of Grenada's orientation and the communist status of the NJM are suggestive of a certain degree of optimism concerning the revolutionary process in Grenada, it bears stressing that these statements were private. In public, Soviet commentators paid little

⁹³ See, for example, the "Agreement Between Grenada and North Korea" (15 April 1983), in Seabury and McDougall, *op. cit.* (note 76), pp. 47-9.