

to benefit more especially the Church of England. On the other hand, the numerous dissenters and those members, also of the Church of England, who entertain non-sectarian views in educational matters, contended that a bequest, which had not been made in terms in favor of one sect, should be deemed to have been intended for all. Indeed, Catholics might even have been allowed to urge that Mr. McGill, being desirous of shewing his gratitude to the inhabitants of a country where he had accumulated his wealth, could not be supposed to have excluded from the benefits of his noble bequest the great majority, nay, at the time when he came to Canada the very people from whom he had almost exclusively gathered the elements of his fortune, and moreover, that considering the great fondness and affection which, by the several legacies of his will, he had shewn to his wife and her children, he could not have meant to exclude their descendants from the college which was to bear his name.

But partly from the fact of the execution of the trust having been left to the Royal institution, the schools of which were far from being popular with their church, partly from the disinclination which they always entertained to any connection with persons of other sects in the management of such affairs, while they had institutions of their own amply provided with all the means of giving a high collegiate instruction, the Catholics did not raise any such issue as might have been grounded on the circumstances just now alluded to.

The McGill University, at the outset, assumed therefore a decided sectarian character, as connected with the Church of England, and even the feelings of the dissenters in the matter were for a long time more commonly evinced by a perfect indifference to the fate of the undertaking, and by a withholding of support from it, than by any course of active hostility.

The other source of difficulty we have mentioned is one which must be familiar to all those who have had to deal practically with educational subjects.

While discussions as to the preeminence to be given to literature, to mathematics or to natural philosophy, in the arrangement of a programme of studies, always remind one of the quarrel between the fencing master, the music master, and the dancing master of the *bourgeois-gentilhomme*—there will always be a great deal of that kind of thing in the management of educational institutions. It is true that all such questions seem to be very summarily disposed of by the answer that every branch of human knowledge is, in its own way, just as useful and just as important as any other branch, and that the success of a college will mainly depend on a fair apportionment, a proper equilibrium of all the influences, which are to assist in training the mind for the accomplishment of its task during life. But the real issue is always as to what will constitute that fair apportionment, that proper equilibrium, and such we believe, was one of the causes of division between the governors and the professors: while the latter were aiming at a classical collegiate education of the same nature as that given in England in the venerable institutions of Oxford and of Cambridge, the community at large was anxious for some kind

of training more congenial, in their opinion, with the position and the wants of a new and progressive country.

(To be continued in our next.)

PIERRE J. O. CHAUVEAU.

A Word about Lying.

The first sin which darkened this earth was a lie. It was committed by the prince of darkness upon the tree of knowledge, and ever since, the increase of wisdom and learning seems to have been followed, to a certain extent, by a decrease of veracity. Lying is the fruitful parent of other sins, the evil spirit which goes out to make room for seven others, the cancer which eats up the vital powers of our higher nature. This seems to have been felt by ancient nations. The Grecian Mythology punished even the deities for lying, and the old Persians' Catechism of Moral Philosophy contained only one great foremost demand,—“to be true to one's self and to others.”

The old Germans had a proverb, “A word, a man,” while now frequently a man is but a word, and in the old Saxon and Gothic languages there is but one word, “ligan,” to signify prostration of body and of soul, while in modern German and English there is but little difference of pronunciation or spelling between liegen and lügen, or a “liar” and a “lier.”

We are surrounded by lying deeds, deceptions, or imitations, and have become so accustomed to them, that we are willing to forbear whenever they make their appearance. There has been a time with several nations, when the relation between the governing and governed rested on a true moral basis; but now the science of politics uses the sheep-skin cloak of patriotism to cover many a deed of selfishness and oppression, chooses liberal names for illiberal acts, and sometimes a glorious end is made to justify ignoble means. The practice of law has lost a great deal of its original purity, and many a lawyer will take greater pains to gain before court the case of his client, than to examine into the true state of things. In trade, assertions are frequently made, which are known to be wrong, or spurious articles are sold for genuine goods. The architect uses wood, sand, and paint to imitate stone, paper to build marble walls, and fresco-painting to make the interior of a room appear larger or higher than it really is. Our ceremonies, literally understood, contain a great deal more than they are intended to convey. Much of our poetry is but fiction—not the history of what has happened, but the creation of imagination. In all dramatic performance, the actors as well as the spectators are for a while withdrawn from real life. We have imitations of all kinds of jewelry, American Eau de Cologne, counterfeit money, manufactured hair, false eyes, teeth and limbs.

We hate to be told by any one what he knows to be untrue. Bankruptcy and even murder are less shameful than a lie. No flush of the cheek is more burning than that which follows the detection of a falsehood. Why is it? Is the word more than a deed, or the tongue more important than the hand?

Jean Paul explains it thus: “When I confront another person, our souls are, as it were, hidden in our bodies. I may guess at his character and intelligence by his eye or his general appearance, but I am without certainty. It is only through language, this embodiment of thought, this audible reason, that I can converse with him. The tongue is the telegraphic wire between soul and soul, his last will is revealed by his spoken word, and the action of his soul lies clearly before me. The importance of the spoken word has lost in intensity by the invention of writing. When an idea is expressed, not in the living, life-giving word, but in dead characters drawn upon lifeless paper, it loses to a great extent its power and vitality, and consequently a lie, when written or printed, appears less punishable. But how annihilating when the spiritual I of another human being communes with mine and tells me a downright lie! His living soul is vanished at once, only his bones, flesh, and skin are before me, and the words spoken by his tongue are just as insignificant to me as the wind whose howling does not indicate any pain. A spoken word may explain or annihilate many deeds; but it requires many deeds to neutralize the sting of one spoken lie. The liar treats his tongue as the beggar does his hand-organ; the instrument plays a plaintive air, while the possessor rejoices at the money he receives. The liar is unjust. I give myself without reserve to him, while he gives me only his body; and by building a draw in the free bridge of true conversation, which he opens and shuts at his pleasure, he makes me a tool of his will.”