

very good, but I don't quite understand the story."

Nor are the bar alone entitled to the credit of brevity and conciseness. The same characteristics distinguish the bench, and in an equally high degree. When the court takes time to consider, the case is indisputably one of some intricacy. Motions involving the rights and franchises of cities, boroughs and gigantic corporations, affecting immense sums of money, determining questions of the deepest public and private interest, and hinging often upon very nice points of technical law, are settled instantly upon the termination of the arguments, and judgment pronounced extemporaneously, and in the fewest possible sentences. No time is taken to draw up diffuse disquisitions upon every single point of law, which may have been mooted in the course of a hearing. Nor is it deemed necessary that the judge, on every occasion, should exercise his learning and attainments by fortifying each successive point, doubtful or not, with a long array of authorities. But he seems to feel that his time belongs to the public, and that he has no right to employ it but in their service. Business presses and must be done,—not talked about, but performed, finished. Great interests always stand waiting; great in the amount of property involved, the number of persons affected, and the legal principles at issue. Expedition, therefore, which is generally a convenience, a virtue, is there a necessity. Yet is this expedition attained not by whipping and spurring, not by sharp and brilliant anticipations of what witnesses or counsel could say, not by arbitrarily cutting cases short and summarily silencing remark. The necessities of society, if nothing better, have taught all concerned in the administration of the law their true places and functions, and they seem to conspire harmoniously in effecting the grand results for which laws are made and courts of justice established. The "patience and gravity of hearing" which Bacon commends, his successors well illustrate. The natural consequence is, that they are addressed by the bar with uniform courtesy and respect, and listened to with marked deference. Business is thus done pleasantly as well as expeditiously; and

good temper and good manners may be learned not less than good law. Of course, these remarks are to be understood *generally*. Particular exceptions doubtless exist, but they do not deserve to be noted, as they do not mar the total impression upon the mind of a stranger.

On the whole, no lawyer can visit the courts of Westminster Hall, and watch the course of business day after day, without being as forcibly impressed with the learning, labour and ability of the men who fill the high judicial stations of England, as with the magnitude and intrinsic importance of the causes which come before them for decision. Nor can he well depart without feeling that a wise and able administration of the law is one of the chief glories of an enlightened state, and that no expenditure can be deemed excessive which may be necessary to secure the highest character and ability for the performance of the arduous duties of the judge. The English judges have "permanent and honourable salaries," and therefore they are what they are. To the citizen of Massachusetts, the reflection can hardly fail to occur that, in his own state, the amount of judicial compensation is carefully calculated and grudgingly doled out, and the retrenchment of a few hundred dollars in this item of public expenditure, is thought to constitute a valid title to public gratitude on the part of its perpetrators. It is, however, somewhat consolatory to know that badly as our judges may be treated, and poorly as they may be paid, the judicial office has thus far fallen upon men of sufficient weight of character to resist these sinister influences, and that nowhere, perhaps, is justice more ably, wisely, uncorruptly and mercifully administered than in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

LAW JOURNAL REPORTS.

COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH—APPEAL SIDE—
JUDGMENTS.

MONTREAL, 2nd March, 1866.

LEGAULT, Appellant, and LEGAULT, Respondent.

Held, That an appeal cannot be brought *in forma pauperis* to the Court of Queen's Bench.

This was a motion for the revision of an order in Chambers, allowing an appeal to be