

	Off'rs	Men	Hors
St. Andrew's Troop Cav.	48	518	
Missisquoi "	3	35	38
Huntingdon "	2	35	37
Brome "	3	34	37
Stansford "	3	34	37
Cookshire "	2	51	53
Sherbrooke "	1	41	42
Compton "	2	34	36
Staff "	2	3	5

N. C. Officers			
	Off'rs	Men	Hors
Sheffield Field Battery	3	71	45
St. John's Gar'n Art'y	3	38	—
11th Batt'n Nos. 2,3,4. and 5 Comps.	10	176	—
21st Batt'n Nos. 1, 2. and 4 Comps.	9	153	—
50th "	30	265	5
51st "	28	316	5
52nd "	22	229	4
53rd "	12	197	—
54rd "	14	82	4
58th "	15	325	—
60th "	23	213	4
79th "	27	173	4
Wakefield Inf. Com'y	3	37	—
Eardley "	2	26	—
Aylwin "	3	50	—

Recapitulation of corps drilled.

N. C. Officers			
	Off'rs	Men	Hors
Cavalry.....	21	315	336
Field Battery.....	3	71	45
Garrison Artillery.	3	38	—
Infantry.....	198	2,248	26

The corps in the District which have yet to complete the annual drill for 1873-74 are as under.

- Montreal Troop of Cavalry.
- Field Battery.
- Engineers (2 Company's).
- Brigade of Garrison Artillery
- 1st or "Prince of Wales Battalion" Rifles.
- 3rd "Victoria Volunteer Rifle" Battalion.
- 6th "Hochelaga Light Infantry."
- Nos. 1, 6, 7 & 8 Companies of 11th Battalion.
- No. 3 Company of 21st Battalion.
- No. 3 "53-d "
- No. 3 & 4 "54th "
- Nos. 1, 6, 7 & 8 Companies 58th Battalion.

These Corps I estimate, will aggregate 77 Officers and 1,125 Non-Commissioned officers and men, 90 horses. should this estimate be realized and I have every reason to believe it will, the total for the annual training for 1873-74, will be about 302 Officers, 3,373 Non-Commissioned officer's and men, and 497 horses: this as regards numbers will compare favourably with last years training.

The force in the district, with the exception of the Montreal Troop of Cavalry, Field Battery and Garrison Artillery, the 1st, 3rd, 6th, 11th, 21st, 53rd and 58th Battalions, and the independent Companies of Infantry, formed regimental camps and performed the drill in eight consecutive days of six hours each, and were generally well carried on, the ground for the camps was invariably well chosen, and the tents nicely pitched; the target practice so far as possible was completed, but experience shews that 40 rounds of ammunition per man is too much to expend profitably in a short a time as eight days. Many of the Battalions fired in squads from the commencement to the finish of the encampment, and were then unable to finish the firing.

The Montreal force is at present labouring under very great disadvantage, and has been ever since the fall of the Drill Hall, and will be necessary to make some provision to replace this loss, if it is considered

desirable to keep up the force; and it is only fair to say, that hitherto it has always answered most heartily to the call for active service.

I beg leave to refer you to my tabulated annual report for details of Inspections, and to the District target practice return for the abstracts of the firing. Until the firing is completed, it is of course impossible for me to name the best shot.

I have the honor to be, Sir,
Your most obedient Servant,
THOMAS BACON, Lt.-Col.
Acting Deputy Adjutant General,
Military District No. 5

(To be continued.)

CORRESPONDENCE.

The Editor does not hold himself responsible for individual expressions of opinion in communications addressed to the VOLUNTEER REVIEW

THE FRENCH CAVALRY—1870.

LETTER NO. 3.

After the unimportant success of General Frossard at Sarrebruck, on 2nd August he retired to the right of the Sarre. On the 6th General Steinty ordered his cavalry to pass through Sarrebruck and gain the left bank, following them up closely he attacked the French 2nd Corps d'armée and forced them after an obstinate and sanguinary engagement to retire on Forbach and from there to St. Arold—this was the battle of Spicheren.

The French Cavalry had nothing to do during the day, but towards evening found an opportunity of acting—and as this little episode of the battle concerns cavalry Soldiers fighting on foot deserves mention. The troops who were entrusted with the duty of guarding the outlets from the wood had been forced to retire and there was no one left at this point but a company of Engineers and a portion of the 12th Dragoons. Two Squadrons of this regiment were accordingly dismounted, and under cover of some slight earthworks hastily thrown up by the Engineers, opened fire on the heads of the advancing columns. Having succeeded in checking their advance, they remounted and charged the enemy whom they repulsed. After this brilliant feat of arms, they retired behind the railway; and with the assistance of the Engineers, they maintained this position long enough to give the troops who occupied Forbach, time to make the dispositions they wished.

After this battle the retreat to Metz commenced. General Cissey losing all patience at the continual surveillance of the enemy's cavalry, ordered the 2nd Hussars to put a stop to it; a squadron of this regiment was accordingly told off to drive them back, and Captain Jouvenot who commanded, by his energetic attack drove in the Prussian outposts, but having pursued too far was repulsed and killed, several officers and men

being wounded—however from this time forth the French army was allowed to retire unmolested to Metz.

In the course of the 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, and 14th various reconnaissances were made by the Chassours d'Afrique; of these one example deserves mention. The German Cavalry had entered the town of Point à Mousson cut the telegraph wires and the railway. Informed of what was going on, General Margueritte turned out his brigade at 1.30 o'clock, proceeded as quickly as possible along the left bank of the Moselle, and arrived about 4 o'clock at Point-à-Mousson. The 3rd Squadron of the 1st Chasseurs d'Afrique, passing through some orchards, galloped up the railway and caught the Germans at work in the railway station. The remainder of the brigade, sword in hand, charged, notwithstanding the slipperiness of the pavement up the streets to the end of the town. There they were received with a fire from the windows. General Margueritte who was in the thick of the affair, was attacked by a Prussian officer, who aimed at his head; his forage cap, however was alone cut, and the Prussian fell covered with wounds. At the termination of some other reconnaissances, that were pushed along the Moselle, the Prussian cavalry, consisting of 4 regiments, after exchanging shots, left the Plateau of Mouzon, having sustained a loss of 2 officers, and 14 men killed, and 2 officers, 32 rank and file, 41 horses, prisoners, who were brought to Metz.

On the 14th the French army was concentrated round Metz; and now all the scattered forces were formed into two armies, viz Marshal Bazaine's and Marshal Mac-Machon's; their one object henceforth, was to unite beyond the forests of the Argonne, the enemy's to prevent them. That evening General de Forton bivouacked on both sides of the Mars la-Tour road, with the brigades Murat (1st and 9th Dragoons) and de Grammont (7th and 10th Cuirassiers)—next day Prince Frederick Charles pushed forward his cavalry to make a reconnaissance on a large scale; and established contact, which was afterwards constantly kept up by scouts. An artillery duel with skirmishing lasted most of the day; and as it was of importance to cut off the retreat of the 2nd and 6th French corps, the Germans marched all the night of the 15th and 16th, traversing an immense track of ground.

On the morning of the 16th August General de Fortons cavalry had been ordered to march at 5 a.m., but this was countermanded, and at 9 the saddles and bridles were taken off. The Dragoon officers in charge of the picquet, had twice sent in to announce the approach of a large body of cavalry and artillery; a staff officer was sent out to see if this was the case, he returned and said there was nothing of importance going on, and the order to take the horses to water was accordingly issued, the arrangement