

even Lord Derby, the Tory leader, held similar views. The latter in speaking of British America said, as late as 1864, that "we know those countries must before long be independent states." Colonial Under-Secretaries like Sir F. Rogers actually urged their chiefs in correspondence, which has been recently published, to prepare for the inevitable separation of the Colonies. Of this school of thought the *Times*, the *Examiner*, the *Westminster Review*, the *Edinburgh Review* and Mr. Goldwin Smith were the literary or journalistic exponents. Its first and perhaps most mischievous expression was in South Africa.

The principle that British citizenship could not be renounced was abandoned, and, after a visit by Sir Harry Smith, Governor of the Cape, in 1848, to the regions immediately north and south of the Vaal River, instructions were sent out by the Colonial Office to withdraw from all further responsibility for their government. Curiously enough the Boers of what is now the Orange Free State objected to complete independence. A Convention of elected delegates was held in 1853 composed of 76 Boers and 19 Englishmen and a constitution drawn up with the words "under the Crown" voluntarily added. But Sir George Clark had been sent out in the meantime as a Special Commissioner to get rid of these migrating and troublesome farmers, and despite protests from the loyal Boers, from all over Cape Colony, and from a deputation of Delegates to the Convention who visited London, the complete independence of the Orange Free State was recognized and a Royal proclamation issued on January 30, 1854, "abandoning and renouncing all dominion and sovereignty" over the territory. Meanwhile, in 1852, the Sand River Convention had been signed by which the right of self-government amongst the Boers of what is now the Transvaal Republic—then merely a series of scattered settlements north of the Vaal—was recognized, subject, however, to the abolition of slavery. This important qualification has never been honestly observed. There was also a general vagueness about the document which did not exist in connection with the Free State arrangement.

In this way were constituted two practically independent Republics of an alien race ready, under possible hostile conditions, to assume the leadership of the Dutch in Natal and Cape Colony as against the English. A little strength of purpose and policy at Downing Street, combined with conciliation at Cape Town, would have at this time given these emigrant farmers self-government and liberty without independence; would have cultivated unity and harmony throughout South Africa in place of developing differences and promoting separate lines of thought and action; and would have averted the evils now menacing and environing the population of all that region. But the opportunity was neglected and went by for a quarter of a century. There remains to us of the statesmanship of that day the present inheritance of trouble and the sapient remark of the Duke of Newcastle to the Delegates who asked him not to throw over the people south of the Vaal, (now the Free State) that "all that England really required in South Africa was Cape Town." Such, however, was the natural outcome of that narrowness of view and lack of Imperial imagination, which in its political embodiment has been called the Manchester School and which would have stripped England of her external power, reduced her to the level of the Holland of to-day, bought peace at practically any price, and then thanked God for a possible reduction in taxation or in the army and navy. Besides the heritage it gave us in South Africa we owe to it the lack of preparation for the Crimean War. Indirectly it made the late Lord Aberdeen when Foreign Secretary in the early fifties refuse to accept California at a nominal price from Mexico

and a little later influenced the Imperial Government to pass over an opportunity of acquiring Alaska. But to return to our subject.

From 1854 to 1876 there is nothing remarkable about the history of the two Republics excepting, perhaps, their invariable indifference to the welfare of the natives within their borders and their aggressiveness and hostility toward surrounding tribes. One important distinction there was as between the two States. The Transvaal had made no real progress and by 1877 was at the mercy of hostile natives and bankrupt in both *prestige* and money. The Orange Free State on the other hand had grown in organized strength and knowledge of self-government—though even to-day ruled by an oligarchy which is very far from our idea of freedom—and also in friendship with the neighbouring Colonies and Imperial authorities. This was due to the wise administration of its President, Sir John Henry Brand, who had five times been elected to the post for five year periods, and during his term of office had refused to accept the Transvaal policy of non-railway connection with the Colonies; had refused to join President Kruger in a defensive military alliance; and had visited England and shown his personal feelings by accepting knighthood from the Queen.

Now we come to the Transvaal annexation of 1877 and the second opportunity afforded for the carrying out of a firm policy and the establishment of English influence finally and forever in a paramount position in South Africa. Let me give the accepted facts in connection with this much discussed subject. In the beginning of the year named, 40,000 Boers in the Transvaal, surrounded within their own borders by 250,000, natives more or less hostile, found themselves at war with Sekukini, a local chief whom they were unable to subdue, and threatened by a ring of Zulu spears along their eastern and southern borders under the command of Cetewayo—a chief who had inherited much of the skill in war which had made his predecessor, Chaka, a name of terror to the whites of all South Africa. The Boers had 6,000 troops unpaid and ill kempt, and no money in the treasury. Under these circumstances a proportion of the Boers—there were then hardly any other whites in the Transvaal—turned to Sir Theophilus Shepstone, who for many years had been the British officer in charge of Imperial and local relations with the natives, and asked his help. A petition in favour of annexation was largely signed and sent home; but it was afterwards said to have contained many forgeries. How far this was the case it was practically impossible to say after the rebellion had once commenced; but there were undoubtedly many honest signatures and, as Lord Carnarvon afterwards pointed out, there was no petition against annexation except one from a few Dutch settlers at the Cape. However this may be, Shepstone knew that England had never given up the claim to interfere in matters affecting the natives and that Lord Carnarvon, then Secretary for the Colonies in the Beaconsfield Government, was at that very moment preparing a scheme for what he hoped would be the voluntary federal union of all the South African States and Colonies.

Shepstone therefore assented to the request for aid under the condition of annexation. No objection was made and Sir Theophilus, who had exceptional powers of administration from the Colonial Office, went to Pretoria and amidst a guard of 26 policemen and without the presence of a single red-coat, proclaimed the country as annexed to the Crown. Sekukini was swiftly subjugated and shortly afterwards the Zulu war ended in the submission of Cetewayo. Meanwhile, Mr. Gladstone had denounced the annexation in Parliament, and, during his famous Midlothian campaign had vividly pictured the unhappy Boer as deprived of his