the ordinary steps in a cause from its commencement to execution, and then takes up the various incidental proceedings in actions, *e. g.*, Disclosure of Parties, Security for Costs, Discovery and Production of Documents, Amendments, etc. Anxious as a critic naturally is to criticise, it is hard to find anything in the arrangement to submit to this invidious process, unless it be the very small point that the matter relating to "Allowance of Service of Writ, when served out of the Jurisdiction," is placed under the heading "Proceedings in Default of Appearance," instead of under that of Service of Writ of Summons.

Some the features of the book which Mr. Holmsted has evidently taken pains to note are—(1) the points in which the old and new practice differ; (2) the points in which the English practice under the Judicature Acts differs from our own; (3) the points on which, owing to the Judicature Act having made no provision, the old practice may be held to continue; (4)the points in which our rules at present are ambiguous or defective; (5) which the forms appended to our Act cause embarrassment by their imperfect accordance with the rules to which they are intended to conform. When we add that Mr. Holmsted has not hesitated to give the reader the benefit of his research and experience to suggest solutions of the difficulties which present themselves, we feel that it is unnecessary to say any more in commendation of his book.

It was our original intention to cite some examples of what we have here stated, and to lay before our readers some of Mr. Holmsted's criticisms and suggestions. It would, however, take up space to little purpose, as we are confident the Manual will be widely, if not universally studied by the profession. One pregnant suggestion, however, to which we would call attention, arises out of the consideration of section 12 of the Act, which provides that, in default of special provision, the practice and procedure is to be the same as that which would have been in use in "*the respective existing Courts*, if the Act had not been passed." This section is taken from section 22 of Imp. Act of 1873, and is natural enough in England, since there the Chancery Division still retains exclusive jurisdiction over the various classes of actions, which, under the previous practice, were more particularly within the category of Chancery causes. But our Act abolishes all distinction, and gives to each Court the jurisdiction formerly possessed by all the others. Mr. Holmsted observes, with apparent justice, that it is to be regretted now that the several Divisions of the High Court have co-ordinate jurisdiction in all actions, that some way could not have been found of completely assimilating the practice in all the Divisions, and suggests that this might have been done by providing that in matters of practice not specially provided for, the practice of the former Courts of Law should prevail, and where there was no practice on the point in the Courts of Law, the former practice in Chancery should be the law, or *vice versa*.

Mr. Holmsted has not overburdened his Manual by citing cases, but seems to have taken much trouble to choose those most necessary to be remembered. We should expressly pick out as useful the remarks on pp. 28-29, as to what property is "separate estate," so as to entitle a married woman plaintiff to sue in respect of it without a next friend; and those on pp. 155-1588 in which he tabulates in a convenient form the cases which show what debts are attachable, and what debts are not attachable. This is not to be found in either of the annotated editions of the Act, Messrs. Taylor and Ewart merely mentioning some of the cases, but not setting out their results in the convenient method adopted by Mr. Holmsted. As to the separate property of married women, Mr. Holmsted points out that, since the decision in *Furness* v. *Mitchell*, 3 App. R. 510, and the Declaratory Act, 40 Vict. c. 7. sched. A. (R. S. O. c. 125, sec. 4, ad ex.), the authority of *Boustead* v. *Whitmore*, 22 Gr. 222, for the proposition that the *jus disponendi* is conferred by R. S. O. c. 125, sec. 4, cannot but be considered as very seriously shaken; and he arrives at the conclusion that it is only property *expressly settled* to her separate use, which comes within R. S. O. c. 125, sec. 7, relating to the wages and personal earnings of a married woman, and any acquisitions therefrom, etc., which is the "separate estate" of a married woman, so as to entitle her to sue without a next friend.

In conclusion, we can cordially recommend