

### *Cruise Missile Testing*

vigorously promoting progress in arms control and disarmament. He went on to say that the goal in all these areas is stability, stability in a lower level of arms and stability in the relationship between offence and defence.

Clearly, as the situation has evolved, there is no reason for the Canadian Government to continue to pursue the same position in regard to cruise missile testing. It is clear that the recent agreement between President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev has changed the situation and does not force the Canadian Government to continue to allow this testing to take place on our soil.

I want to say that I have grave doubts about the Government's clear intentions of trying to bring stability to the situation, particularly when we look at what it has been doing in relation to its position in NATO and its decision to buy nuclear submarines. It is, as my Leader said when he was speaking in Vancouver recently—

[*Translation*]

While superpowers are talking about weapons reductions, our Conservative Government decides that Canada will build ten or twelve nuclear attack submarines, which could cost as much as \$16 billion. The construction and deployment of attack submarines signal a radical departure from the deterrence role our armed forces have played traditionally. In my opinion, the Government is wrong to seek to equip Canada with nuclear attack submarines in the Arctic. The Government says those ships will be used for the surveillance and defence of our waters in the North. If so, there are less expensive, safer and more efficient means of doing the job.

I say in conclusion it seems obvious to me the Conservative Government, far from seizing the opportunities it has to contribute to disarmament, has chosen to follow the armament and global destabilization route.

• (1440)

**Mr. Michel Champagne (Parliamentary Secretary to Minister for External Relations):** Mr. Speaker, it also gives me great pleasure to take part in the debate on motion No. 67 related to the termination of cruise missile testing in Canada.

I have just heard the Hon. Member for Papineau (Mr. Ouellet) conclude on a note which I find somewhat inappropriate in view of the criticisms which the Official Opposition has addressed to us in the past about the ability of Canada to defend its territorial zone in the Arctic. We can tell him that we are taking the appropriate means to provide this defence and that, in our opinion, nuclear submarines are the best way to defend our territory and to prevent the Americans from violating the sovereignty of our territorial waters whenever they wish, as the Opposition said earlier.

Mr. Speaker, we should perhaps examine more closely the purpose of this motion. It seems to presume that cruise missile testing in Canada goes against our arms control and security objectives. In my opinion, such a presumption is false. The

maintenance of a strong and effective defence is not inconsistent with the objectives of arms control and disarmament. On the contrary, the will to maintain a credible nuclear deterrence can make it easier to come to an agreement, as evidenced by the signing of the historical treaty on intermediate nuclear forces.

In spite of the success of the INF treaty, and perhaps because of the hopes it has raised, mistaken notions still persist about the air-launched cruise missiles, their relation to the US-USSR negotiations in Geneva on strategic weapons reduction and the importance of continued testing of these missiles. I would like to take this opportunity to correct these mistakes.

The US-USSR INF agreement applies to the middle-range missiles deployed in Europe. It does not apply to long-range strategic systems, which include the air-launched cruise missiles. The signing of this treaty never involved the termination of testing for these missiles.

The only link between the deployment of the INF's and the testing of air-launched cruise missiles is that of NATO solidarity. By deploying the INF's and other nuclear weapons on their territory, the Europeans have shown their political support for the nuclear deterrence force of NATO. Canada is doing nothing else by allowing the testing on its territory of the cruise missiles which are essential to deterrence. These tests are part of our contribution to our collective security, which is based on modern and effective weapons. And it is because we have maintained this power of deterrence unflinchingly that we have had over forty years of peace and security.

The strategic systems, both the long-range ballistic missiles and the cruise missiles, are under the START negotiations. Within this framework, the United States and the USSR have agreed in principle to reduce by 50 per cent the number of their nuclear warheads. The number of airborne cruise missiles will be subjected to the limits established under the START negotiations. Canada, for one, has indicated that it is in favour of reducing by 50 per cent these warheads and limiting the number of cruise missiles.

Without the Alliance's solidarity and determination to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent force, it is doubtful that the Soviet Union would have accepted to resume the Geneva negotiations, negotiations which have finally resulted in the elimination of a whole class of middle range weapons. The same solidarity and determination will be necessary to achieve any progress in the reduction of strategic systems.

A unilateral decision by Canada to terminate airborne cruise missile testing in Canada would have detrimental effects on the Alliance's strategic deterrent force and would jeopardize the solidarity which has proven so efficient in the FNI area. This testing is Canada's contribution to the maintenance of NATO's strategic nuclear deterrent force. It is a rather modest contribution compared with that of our European allies who, even with the elimination of the INFs, will bravely continue to deploy on their territories the nuclear weapons essential to peace.