

Another model, sometimes recommended for APEC and Asia-Pacific: NAFTA-like sidebars to agreements on trade and investment, which would lay down agreed rules for compliance with labor, environmental or other standards.

A further word (but not the last, no doubt) on corporate codes of conduct. It may be that company managers are well placed to see the need for a rule—to correct labor abuses, say, or to remedy some environmental harm—and strategically positioned to take efficient action. Even so, it is fair to ask if it is always enough to leave these decisions to people who might be well-meaning but who are also unelected. What responsibilities remain with the Canadian people, and with the government they elect to act for them?

As Canadians sort out these questions, one proposition at least might find agreement: It is better to have a good effect on the exercise of human rights abroad than to please our own consciences, or to strike smug poses. Firm moral purpose can co-exist with tactics shaped to particular cases. In that regard, it must be acknowledged that Canada is a smallish state in Asia-Pacific affairs. Whereas China or Indonesia might have to take into account threats and inducements from the United States in deciding their human-rights practices, the opinion of the Canadian government weighs less heavily in their calculations. Good effect, therefore, often requires Canadians to act in concert with others in order to influence governments very much bigger.

Acting with others comes almost instinctively to Canadians; multilateralism has been a trait of Canadian diplomacy for decades. But it does not always find adherents in Asia-Pacific, where governments have generally practised a rigorously quiet and non-meddling form of bilateralism. Only in recent years, and with Canada's earnest