

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

which the United States Administration's negative attitude is well known. We would like to hope that this formula does not mean that the United States approaches the chemical weapons negotiations in the same way it is approaching the issue of multilateral negotiations on banning nuclear weapon tests.

We were also surprised by the fact that, without reacting to all the numerous questions under consideration at the negotiations, the distinguished United States representative concentrated solely on inviting Soviet representatives to visit a chemical weapons destruction facility in Tooele. Is this really the key to success at the multilateral negotiations on banning chemical weapons? Would it not have been more useful to concentrate on those crucial questions which are currently holding back progress at the negotiations?

On many such questions the United States position still remains unclear. This also refers, in particular, to such a field as challenge inspections. The present United States views, in our understanding, presuppose that a challenge without the right of refusal should cover all sites and facilities on the territory of a State party without distinction as to the form of ownership or the degree of Government control thereof. Such was the United States interpretation of article X of its draft convention in CD/500. And what, in this connection, would its interpretation be of article XI of the same document? Is this article deleted or not? And if it remains, then in what cases does the United States side propose to apply it? Resolving the issue of challenge inspections depends to a considerable degree on the answer to this question.

There is another problem -- that of responsibility for the actions of the subsidiary of a company registered in one of the States parties to the future convention. In this case, two situations may arise: when the subsidiary operates on the territory of another State party, and when it operates in a State not party to the convention. A third situation is also possible: that in which an international company registered in the territory of a State party operates in the territory of such a State. Such transnational corporations sometimes operate on the territory of other countries as a "State within a State", refusing to allow the activities of their subsidiaries to be monitored. The question of which State should be responsible for ensuring that these corporations observe the provisions of the convention is therefore of practical importance. Answers to this question would seem to be called for not only from the United States but also from other States in whose economic systems companies with considerable networks of affiliates on the territory of other States play an extensive role.

I have already touched upon the problem of confidence as applied to the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. We are in favour of confidence. But we do not understand how the goal of confidence-building on the eve of concluding a convention can be combined with attempts to start at all costs the production of new types of chemical weapons, in particular binary weapons. If the conclusion of the convention is considered to be such a long-term objective as a nuclear test-ban, the production of chemical