

# THE BULLFROG.

*Nec sumit aut ponit securus,  
Arbitrio popularis auræ.—Hor.*

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## AMERICA AND B. N. AMERICA.

"The surrender of LEE creates a profound sensation of thankfulness and joy all over the country. Salutes and public rejoicings are the order of the day." Such was the concluding portion of a telegram which—received in this city on Monday last, created, as may be imagined, no small stir among the people. The news of LEE's surrender has an interest, not for us only, but for the whole civilized world. All must rejoice at the prospect of a cessation of hostilities between men for the most part alike in origin, in language, and in creed. In Europe, the news will create an interest most profound. Men of all parties in England and in France will rejoice to learn that after four years of devastation, and bloodshed unparalleled in the annals of civil war, peace is about to be restored. But with the rejoicing will mingle feelings of deep anxiety, and the wisest heads of Europe will ponder the significant question:—What policy will America now adopt? This question has at the present moment a very grave significance. The position in which America now stands with relation to the great European powers is very different from that wherein she stood four years back. At the commencement of hostilities America had no claims to be regarded as a power possessed of military strength. However rich the neighbouring States may have been in the various essentials necessary for carrying on a protracted war, the resources at their command could at best be regarded only as so much raw material. They were rich in men and in money, and descendants of a race not used to turn their backs upon a foe,—but beyond this they were far from formidable. Their first armies were badly handled and almost totally undisciplined, and had the Trent affair resulted in hostilities with England, we should have had but little reason to despair of success. But how different is the case now! Four years campaigning has fashioned the raw material into an army, not, it is true, so highly disciplined as the armies of Europe, but yet fit for immediate duty, and well inured to the rough vicissitudes of active service. Of GRANT's soldiers it may indeed be said—the tyrant custom hath made the flinty and steel couch of war their three-driven bed of down. And the several campaigns have not only fashioned soldiers, but have likewise produced men capable of handling them to advantage. Should Americans still be eager for war, they can command the services of strategists competent to plan and direct a campaign, and of tacticians able to take advantage of a position wherein strategy has placed them. And let us for one moment consider the temper of the people having this powerful force at their command—for in the neighbouring States every thing, or nearly every thing, hinges upon the temper of the masses for the time being. The temper of a portion, (and we fear a large portion) of the American press is undisguisedly hostile towards England, and a portion of the English press has thought proper to accept this hostile tone as the reflection of American feeling. The voice of Mr. SEWARD is, it is true, for peace, but the public men of America cannot stand any very powerful pressure from without, and it is with the masses, for whose edification the *N. York Herald* is edited, rests the real question of quiet or turmoil. That America will in future keep up a large standing army is highly improbable; indeed, the presence of a large army in times of peace

would tend to weaken the distinctive nationality of those who acknowledge no rulers other than the people themselves. A standing army in the States would soon come to be regarded as a standing menace. The question then arises—what will become of GRANT's army, made up, as it is for the most part, of hirelings from foreign shores? There are, to our thinking, two ways of answering this question. GRANT's soldiers may be induced to settle down quietly upon American soil, in which case they will (thanks to the resilient properties of everything American) doubtless prosper; or else the American people—conscious of their present military strength—may resolve to use that strength for the purpose of acquiring new territory. Should any such resolve be acted upon—should the Americans, while yet flushed with success, act upon the principle "nothing venture nothing have"—what will be the position of B. N. America? We do not say that there is any direct prospect of immediate danger, but this we do say—that under existing circumstances it were nothing short of madness to sit down with folded arms speculating upon what England will do, or what England will not do for us. It is no use dreaming of what we might do supposing all the Provinces united by Confederation; the question now to be considered is—are we doing all we can to provide against a contingency which may arise, we know not how soon. We cannot in the event of a war fairly reckon upon being reinforced by English troops, although we should of course be aided by a powerful naval force. Pending the release of Messrs. SIDDELL and MASON, the Home Government lost no time in sending across the Atlantic a body of soldiers, among whom were a portion of the Brigade of Guards—the flower of the British Army. But would the Home Government act in the same manner now? We fancy not. A British force which, four years back, might have routed a horde of men, undisciplined, undrilled, and for all practical purposes, unofficered—could now, at best, but perish gallantly, outnumbered ten fold. What could 10,000, or 15,000 British troops do against a force such as could now be brought against them? Colonel JERVOISE's report furnishes the best answer to this question; they could do comparatively nothing. Much has lately been written about the moral force of Union, but, to our thinking, our safety must mainly depend upon the number of men, well drilled, well armed, and well officered, which the several Provinces are known to contain. The moral influence of 400,000 able bodied men, expert in the use of their rifles, tolerably well equipped, and able to manœuvre with steadiness and precision, must always be considerable,—far greater in reality than any influence based upon the romantic idea of consolidated British Empire on this side of the Atlantic. Are the several Provinces at the present moment doing all in their power to perfect their militia and volunteers,—are we in Nova Scotia doing all we can in this respect? That our militia organization is yet far from being perfect, there can be no doubt whatever. Open at random the Adjutant General's Report and note the opinions of the Inspecting Field Officers. The words which commonly meet the eye are—"additional training much required both for officers and non-commissioned officers". "Lieut.-Col. P. did not handle his Regiment, nor were the officers very competent, having received no regular instruction."—"The