

illustrative of these two modes of gratification, an object of such character or relation as excites the subjective sense of admiration, may be also of such character or relation as gratifies it. This is a case of Direct gratification.

But a person may present himself in such character or relations as excite my gratitude. Then my gratitude seeks gratification by putting him in the place of the receiver, and myself in the place of the giver; that is, I put him in a different character or relation, in order to gratify my sense of gratitude. This is a case of Responsive gratification.

Subjective feelings of aversion seek gratification also in either of these two ways; for feelings of aversion may be gratified as well as those of desire, though the two are different in their nature; thus, hate, a feeling of aversion, seeks gratification in acts of malice.

It is well, however, to note that nearly all feelings of aversion are gratified responsively. Subjective senses of positive or negative obligation (=ought or ought not), are each of them pacified in one or other of these two ways, namely, directly or responsively. The latter form however, prevails; thus, the knowledge of the character or relations of my brother, may excite in me the subjective feeling, that I ought to help him; that is, that I ought to put him in different character or relations. The impulse, in this case, seeks gratification responsively.

All subjective senses of positive or negative obligation, not only seek pacification either directly or responsively, but they have two modes of doing even this. A subjective sense of obligation prompts me to do direct duty; but if I have failed in doing so, it prompts me to compensate for the neglect of it. From this it follows, that when a subjective sense of obligation cannot obtain pacification either directly or responsively in the character or relation of simple or direct duty, it will seek it responsively in the character or relation of compensative duty. Thus, the knowledge of the relation which a person sustains to me, excites in me the sense or impulse of obligation to help him. My subjective impulse seeks pacification responsively in direct duty. But if I have failed to assist him, it seeks pacification responsively, by prompting me to make him reparation for my injury; that is, it seeks pacification in compensative duty.

It is well to note here, in connection with the gratification or pacification of subjective senses, that not only is knowledge (that is, perception or reasoning) necessary to excite the senses, but it is also necessary to point out or devise means of gratifying or pacifying them. It shows to the mind certain methods of character or relation, by which the sense may be gratified or pacified.

Imagination (see definition), while helpful, by its suggestive function, to perception or reasoning in doing the above, may also by its own power present to the mind characters or relations that may stimulate the impulse or desire; but it wants the certainty or assurance of knowledge, that is needed to satisfy it. The aesthetic feelings, however, spoken of before, and some others, may be regarded as exceptions.

We would also note that the excitement and gratification of a subjective sense, may often be simultaneous, as in the case of a sudden and unexpected vision of a beautiful landscape. It excites and gratifies at the same moment.

Abatement or Subsidence of the Subjective Senses.

All subjective senses or feelings abate or subside on gratification or pacification, except the permanent ones, which still remain active. A feeling, abated on gratification or pacification, is said to be appeased.

The only other method of abatement or subsidence, is the removal of the exciting cause. We shall now, in the same order as presented in the Table, proceed to discuss with more care, and at greater length, the various classes of the subjective senses of the human mind.

Subjective Senses or Feelings arising from a Physical Source.

This class of subjective senses were first introduced in connection with objective physical sensation (that by the five senses), and have been so frequently referred to since, that it seems unnecessary to occupy much space with their further illustration.

All subjective senses of this order owe their existence to the connection between the nervous organization and the mind. Destroy the appropriate or corresponding nerve, and the sense ceases. If the nerve of touch is destroyed, neither the objective sense of heat, nor the subjective sense of pain which it produces, is felt. Remove the nerve line connecting with the organs of appetite, and the subjective senses of hunger, thirst, sexual connection, forever cease to disturb or give pleasure.

But though this class of subjective feelings arise all alike from the nerves of sensation distributed over the body, there is a difference in the nature of the feelings themselves. We may divide them, (1) into the occasional, those arising from the nerves of sight, hearing,