

be held responsible at every moment for efficient administration in all parts of the city government.

The next element in efficient administration on the part of a city government is that it should work together. The police department, for example, touches in its daily duties the department of city works, the health department, the fire department, and the building department. The ordinances affecting all these departments depend for their enforcement upon the efficiency and co-operation of the police. The failure to co-operate with one another, so frequently found in the executive heads of departments springs in the main from the absence of any tie compelling them to realize a common responsibility. They are, indeed, officers of the same city, but that is all. His department is his business, and nobody else's. If they are nominated by the mayor and confirmed by the council, such appointments usually involve the feeling that they represent this or that personal interest. The idea of a common responsibility to work together for the public interest never presents itself under such conditions. It happens, therefore, that city governments often are loose ends, very much as the planets would be if the law of gravitation were suspended. Collisions in the heavens would not be more certain in the presence of such a suspension of the law of gravity, than conflicts between departments are certain in a city government which is held to no common responsibility. This element of responsibility to a common head can only be effectively obtained through the appointment of all such officials by the mayor of the city. This relation gives to a city government precisely the element which is needed a responsibility to a common head who is himself responsible to the people of the city. A government so ordered, as compared with a government in which the heads of departments feel each one independent of all the others, would present precisely such a result as that which so frequently is seen upon the football field, where a fifteen which is in the habit of playing together defeats a fifteen made up of better individual players who have not been in the habit of playing together.

The same conditions which result in the highest degree of efficiency happily result also in the greatest measure of popular control. It would be impossible to get the judgement of the people at the same election upon all laws of the legislature. In the same way, it is impossible for the people of a city to discriminate intelligently as to many officials at a single election. To tell the people that they must elect one officer this year and another officer next year, and still another officer a third year before they can get control of even a single department of the city government, is to enter upon a task which is hopeless from the beginning. To tell the people that they must choose a good mayor, because the