

The non-proliferation treaty requires inspection on quite a wide scale, but I believe it has nothing to say in connection with facilities for recycling the uranium with the plutonium and rods in connection with reactors. If that is the case—and the Secretary of State for External Affairs will correct me if I am wrong—this is very serious. Why would a country want installations that can reprocess the rods that have been used? It is said that Brazil wants such a plant, and that France and Germany are prepared to supply such plants to countries that want them.

An editorial in the *New York Times* of Wednesday, June 11, said:

The only significant use for plutonium now is for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices indistinguishable from weapons. Commercial use of plutonium as a power reactor fuel depends essentially on perfection of the breeder reactor which is not expected for 15 to 20 years.

No commercial plutonium separation plant is now operating in the United States. The 52 American power reactors store their spent fuel rods for possible future use. It would take a \$500 million chemical reprocessing plant serving 30 giant nuclear power reactors to achieve the economies of scale that might make plutonium recycling commercially feasible.

If that is right then one has to ask for what possible reason, other than getting itself into a position to make a bomb, would any country want to acquire facilities for recycling these rods used in reactors like the CANDU reactor? As I understand it, our own CANDU reactor does generate plutonium. It is now alleged that because of the way it operates, whatever its great advantages may be—and I have no doubt they are great—the CANDU reactor generates twice as much plutonium as it operates, as does the United States type of reactor. That places a particular burden upon Canada to see that our inspections and safeguards are adequate.

There are half a dozen countries trying to export installations, reactors, or technology—the United States, France, Germany, Canada, U.S.S.R. and, I believe, Great Britain. France seems to take the attitude, according to *Le Monde*, that proliferation is inevitable and will sell plants to recycle the fuel to reactors. West Germany is also reported to be willing to supply such fuels even to countries which have not signed the non-proliferation agreement.

I believe the United States has become much stricter and passed a law in 1974 requiring approval by Congress before a deal can be made involving the sale of reactors or technology by the United States.

I suggest there can be no question about the dangers—reactors do generate a lot of plutonium. Some people have made estimates of how much plutonium would be generated by the reactors by 1980, 1985 or 1990.

In addition to what a government of a country may want to do improperly with such plutonium, there is also the danger in connection with terrorists. What steps do we take, for example, when dealing with a country like South Korea or Argentina where, from my limited reading, one could not say the governments are exactly secure or permanent?

What safeguards are we insisting on, for example, with regard to the safety of such plutonium, the safety of such fuel, the safety of such technology from terrorists in those countries? What safeguards are we insisting upon with

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regard to the transportation of fuel to those reactors that we are trying to sell?

There are about half a dozen suppliers of nuclear technology and reactors and that sort of thing, although a great many countries in the world have not signed the non-proliferation treaty. As an interim arrangement, is it possible to get some satisfactory restraints agreed upon and debated by those half dozen countries? The minister might indicate whether Canada is exploring that. I have heard the United States has been pushing that kind of arrangement, in other words attempting to control the situation and get some firm guidelines and commitments adopted by the countries which have the technology and are exporters of the technology.

Is this not an approach which offers more promise of keeping the situation under control in the short run than some attempt to achieve a world-wide agreement involving all countries? Some senators in the United States have called for a moratorium. We should consider the idea seriously. A moratorium on the sale of reactors and nuclear technology would give us breathing space, and allow us to bring the current situation under control. We should work to this end.

• (1550)

I read a list of deals already under way. It looks to me as if the situation is already out of hand; I am not speaking of what Canada is doing, but of what is happening in the world. The situation is getting out of hand. At present half a dozen countries of the world can bring it under control, if they want to. I ask, why not have a moratorium? Why does Canada not push for a moratorium, a moratorium associated with the effort to get other countries possessing nuclear technology to enter into a firm agreement? We want countries possessing nuclear technology to adopt firm controls.

I hear that Canada is promoting a model bilateral agreement which it hopes other countries will adopt. That may be Canada's approach to bringing this problem under control. If it is, why are we not told about it? Why are we not told in detail how strict the safeguards are to be? The Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources told us about the guidelines other countries had to accept in connection with the purchase of the CANDU reactor. Those guidelines may be strict and reasonably satisfactory for the CANDU, but they do not seem to involve the regulation of the total nuclear activities of the countries buying the reactor.

Are the guidelines we are demanding strict enough? How broad are they? Do they really deal with the problem of recycling plants? Do they deal adequately with the question of technology? Supposing that the guidelines control the technology used in the CANDU reactor and its fuel, do they really prevent the country with which we make a deal from taking our technology and going on from there? Those are the questions we are asking, particularly in view of the kinds of deals the government has been making.

I do not want to look down my nose at the government of South Korea or the government of Argentina; nevertheless those governments, because of conditions in those countries—I will put it as tactfully as I can—are not the most stable in the world. They are also, as I said before,