

having resolutions adopted calling for military and other action which might not have to be taken by them at all but by a very few states which may be in a dissenting minority. This situation might be intolerable if the resolutions of the General Assembly had a binding legal effect on all the United Nations members, or if the smaller states exercised their voting power irresponsibly.

Even in its present form this exercise of voting power, which is something apart from veto power, at times threatens the effectiveness and could, in certain circumstances, threaten even the integrity of the United Nations. It has led to suggestions that there should be some form of weighted voting corresponding in rough fashion with the population, the strength and actual contribution of the member-states to the Organization. These proposals for new voting procedures are usually quite complicated and rarely find widespread support. Agreement on criteria for weighting is almost as impossible to achieve in international political bodies as it would be in regard to weighted voting by state representatives in the United States Senate. The criterion of population alone, for instance, would certainly not do, because it is often in conflict with such tests as economic resources and development, trade and commercial importance, or military strength.

The principle of one state, one vote, does not, of course, apply to all the agencies of the United Nations. Indeed the General Assembly is the only such agency in which every member-state is represented and, therefore, has a vote. The membership of other organs is restricted in the interest - not always realized - of speedy and effective action. In the Security Council, on which, according to the Charter, the members conferred primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, there is another kind of deviation from the rule of equality. I refer, of course, to the provision that in other than procedural matters affirmative votes must include those of the five permanent members: China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. It is, however, not this rule itself, but its excessive and irresponsible exercise, principally by the Soviet Union, which has had such unhappy consequences and has largely frustrated the effective operation of the Security Council in political and security matters. The veto possessed by a select group only, is an extreme form of weighted voting and the dissatisfaction caused by its operation is a warning of the difficulties of devising both equitable and workable constitutions for international organizations.

Let us now turn for a moment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It was largely because of the failure of the United Nations to implement, through the Security Council, the Charter provisions for organizing collective security universally that certain countries felt it necessary to make their own more limited collective defence arrangements by an agreement concluded under Article 51 of the Charter. This short and simple international agreement, the North Atlantic Treaty, the third anniversary of whose signature was celebrated two weeks ago, remains, until the United Nations can function more effectively, the most important international instrument for the defence of the free world and the preservation of international peace. Unlike the United Nations Charter, the North Atlantic Treaty does not erect an elaborate and somewhat rigid structure for carrying out the aims and objectives of its signatories. Apart from establishing a Council on which each of the parties to the Treaty is represented, and a defence