

(Mr. García Moritán, Argentina)

In any case, in our subcontinent, South America, the States - through pronouncements like the Mendoza Agreement, the official text of which is now before the distinguished delegations, which comprises Brazil, Argentina and Chile and to which the Eastern Republic of Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia will accede, as well as the Declaration of Cartagena of the Indies, uniting the efforts of Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia and Venezuela - have sent a strong and unanimous political signal of support for the convention through the commitment of our countries to be original signatories of the convention.

To the above must be added the public expressions of many other countries in other continents and regions along similar lines, all of which allows us to conclude that we have already reached the critical mass necessary to launch the first multilateral convention prohibiting completely and without discrimination an entire category of weapons of mass destruction.

Mr. President, as we proceed to this final phase of the negotiations, allow me to share with you briefly some ideas which Brazil and Argentina consider relevant and which are currently being dealt with in the Ad Hoc Committee.

First, as regards the verification regime. In our opinion, it would be advisable to deal with realistic assumptions. The scheme of inspections will necessarily have to adjust to the realities of a budget which will inevitably be limited. Consequently, we must ask ourselves whether it would be sensible to aim at a scheme requiring a very large number of inspections if that target cannot be met. We would be running the risk of unleashing a gigantic system which would not provide the degree of security proportional to the resources that would be at its disposal.

The system of routine inspections should, in our judgement, be guided by clear cost-effective criteria. At the same time, as is the case in other, similar situations, the inspections would have to be made primarily by the Organization, including such aspects as the designation of relevant facilities and the execution of the inspections themselves.

As regards such questions as national designations in connection with inspections of the chemical industry, the principle could be reflected in the convention in such a way as not to weaken the powers and the role of the Technical Secretariat vis-à-vis the views of the States parties, which could be taken into consideration as suggestions. On that understanding and with those limitations it should not prove very difficult even now to arrive at compromise formulas.

As to another aspect of challenge inspections, Brazil and Argentina would perhaps have preferred to see a model of challenge inspections closer to the original version (anytime, anywhere and without right of refusal) than the one we are finally considering.

The approach suggested in the proposal of the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan and Australia departs considerably from that scheme, probably owing to the new reading its authors have given to the post-cold war