

(Mr. von Stulpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

expressing its own opinion on whether or not the requested State is in compliance. Second, the requesting State or any other State cannot be prevented from drawing its own conclusions and taking those measures it considers necessary to maintain its national security, even if its assessment is not shared by the Executive Council. No individual State can be bound by decisions or measures adopted by the Executive Council which it perceives as jeopardizing its national security.

For me the following questions result from these basic considerations: Does the "bilateral versus multilateral" distinction have practical implications for the challenge inspection régime? If so, in what way would it have to be taken into account? Do possible actions of the executive Council or the requesting or requested States parties have to be prescribed or described in the convention? In cases of non-compliance, what is the difference in post-inspection procedures between routine and challenge inspections? Bearing these questions in mind, I wonder whether the issue cannot adequately be covered by the provisions on the political organs of the Organization as set forth in article VIII of the convention.

Let me in conclusion address another very important point concerning the challenge inspections régime - the question of protecting sensitive installations. This question has been widely discussed, and a number of provisions to this end have already been elaborated. I would just like to recall in this regard the provisions contained in the protocol on inspection procedures under the heading "Managed access".

It is on this point in particular that we were able to record a lot of progress last year. However, I recognize that the issue is a very delicate one, in particular since challenge inspections, as they are discussed in the framework of our negotiations, are very broad in scope and have no precedent in the history of arms control and disarmament. I also recognize that a merely conceptual discussion of the implications of the intrusiveness of challenge inspections and possible precautions and measures to protect sensitive information is not enough. The problem cannot be dealt with in the abstract. Rather, practical experience is needed.

To gain such experience we - like others - are currently undertaking a series of trial challenge inspections in military facilities. I am pleased to introduce today the report on our first trial challenge inspection in a military facility. The report has been distributed as an official document of the Conference today. Its results suggest that at facilities like the ammunition depot chosen for our first trial, an effective challenge inspection might be possible without sensitive information having to be disclosed. It was encouraging to see that what we have termed in our report "secondary indicators" may in certain cases do a lot to dispel doubts about compliance.

We would welcome a discussion on our findings within the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. And I am confident that such a discussion will contribute to the further clarification of the as yet unclear concepts of alternative measures and managed access. The question of whether and, if so, how alternative measures would differ from managed access has stimulated considerable discussion. It remains to be answered convincingly. In my view