

(*svruxhvouruzhenostta*),¹⁹ thereby excluding either the pursuit of superiority or a military build-up.

But if the idea of superiority has been excluded by political (and also economic) imperatives, the case has not been so clear in distinguishing sufficiency from parity (*paritet*). In theory there is nothing that makes the idea of parity and the principle of sufficiency mutually exclusive.²⁰ But it is important to know, for the present purposes, whether the idea of sufficiency is simply another way of talking about the idea of parity or whether it implies something rather different. A wide spectrum of opinion exists on this subject in the Soviet Union and discussions on the issue often suffer from a lack of conceptual clarity. However, there does appear to exist a fairly clear consensus that the idea of reasonable sufficiency, at a minimum, rejects the pursuit of quantitative parity, especially if this means matching weapon system for weapon system with an adversary. Although in practice this Soviet distinction is not always easy to maintain, it is significant nonetheless.²¹

At the most radical end of the spectrum some individuals have been critical of what is called the "parity cult" in which Soviet policies became concerned with parity as

¹⁹ "Interview with P. Lushev in *Narodna Mladezh*" (Bulgaria), 22 February 1989 in *FBIS-SU*, 27 February 1989, p. 89.

²⁰ Soviet definitions of nuclear sufficiency are a case in point. Most analysts accept the idea that parity is desirable for the purposes of strategic stability, although this is most frequently understood as parity at the lowest possible levels. The same clear-cut acceptance of parity has not occurred with respect to conventional weapons or forces.

²¹ The distinction between quantitative versus qualitative factors is fraught with difficulties, and Soviet discussions, supposedly about the latter, often deteriorate into arguments about who has how much, or equality of qualitative factors. For example, see Akhromeyev's comments about East-West equality of armament quality in: S. F. Akhromeyev, "The Correlation of Armed Forces in Europe and the Talks", *Pravda*, 2 March 1989 (1st ed.), p. 4, in *FBIS-SU*, 2 March 1989, p. 5.

Still the distinction holds if one understands it as simply a general shift in emphasis, rather than a strict rejection of discussions about number of weapon systems or forces. The Soviet distinction is important because an acceptance of the general idea of the importance of qualitative factors opens the door to greater flexibility in quantitative reductions.