

neither could these independent arsenals be ignored. The issue must be addressed forthrightly. Mr. Frye suggested a formula to deal with this problem: after reducing to a specified level, the superpowers could ask that "third country" arsenals be kept to some fixed percentage of that level. If any third power deployed more weapons, exceeding that fixed percentage, the superpower targeted would be free to deploy an equivalent number of weapons. This provision, said Mr. Frye, would pave the way for serious negotiations with Paris, London and Peking.

Mr. Frye also pointed out that it was important to follow the established counting rules in order to expedite a treaty. It was encouraging that Moscow accepted the necessity of lowering both launcher limits and warhead totals. Under SALT I, bombers not equipped with cruise missiles were considered equivalent to single-warhead ICBMs. Under SALT II, a bomber carrying cruise missiles was deemed to be carrying 20 warheads and was counted as a MIRVed* launcher. If these counting rules were accepted, and if the United States and the Soviet Union were serious about reducing nuclear weaponry, there was, said Mr. Frye, real hope for movement in Geneva.

2. Elaboration of Soviet Position

The following speaker, Oleg Bykov, Deputy Director of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations in Moscow, said that the Soviet Union had made significant contributions to the Geneva negotiations and that Gorbachev was committed to stopping "the baleful arms race." His presentation focussed on those aspects of the Soviet arms control proposal which were either "novel or controversial." The Soviet negotiators had proposed a ban on all space weapons, including anti-satellite (ASAT) weaponry and space-based ballistic missile defence (SBBMD).

The USSR had also proposed a 50 percent cut in all strategic weapons, which would mean "radical reductions" both in delivery systems (missiles and bombers) and in nuclear "charges" (warheads, gravity bombs, cruise missiles). The goal of this initial "deep-cut" would be a ceiling of 6,000 warheads on each side. Taking into consideration the obvious asymmetries in the arsenals of the two sides, the proposal allowed for choice in the configuration of each side's triad of strategic forces, setting a 60 percent limit on the number of warheads allowable within any one "leg" of the strategic

* MIRV = multiple, independently-targetable re-entry vehicles.