

Canadian Space Agency as well as more familiar departments such as External Affairs, National Defence, and Science and Technology. Although individual departments may engage in their own long-term programmes, there is no evidence that the Government as a whole has developed a capability for long-term *policy* (rather than programme) analysis. In addition, the adequacy of bilateral mechanisms for consultation and discussion with the United States might also be fruitfully reviewed. The process of consultation and policy formation which produced the NWS decision appears to be an interesting case in point, for the criticisms which have been made since suggest that the decision-making process failed to address all the relevant Canadian considerations.

To turn to more specific issues, it is clear that decisions involving new technologies such as space-based radars and submarine programmes will place great strain on the existing and projected levels of Canadian defence expenditures. If proportionately larger allocations of defence funds must be directed towards continental defence, certain broad foreign policy implications are inevitable. Specifically, Canada may be unable to commit forces of any significance to Europe *and* to enter into very costly programmes in North America. The political interest in maintaining the broadest possible allied forum for inter-governmental consultation and policy-making now contrasts sharply with the military and economic factors drawing Canada into a North American, continentalist defence posture.

This paper has suggested an approach to continental defence issues which might provide a guideline for dealing with the mounting pressures to pursue defensive technologies against aircraft and cruise missiles. It is, in effect, to limit Canadian involvement to activities which would provide peacetime surveillance and crisis stability, and to desist from programmes which, in the last resort, assume nuclear war-fighting. Hence, for Canada, non-survivable strategic surveillance systems should be considered acceptable, while the move towards survivable air-based or defended space-based surveillance systems should not be considered a high priority for scarce resources. Similarly, active continental defence against cruise missiles, implying an ongoing wartime nuclear exchange, should be avoided by Canada, but a modest northern-based capability to prevent peacetime intrusions should be given high priority. And in regard to submarines and maritime surveillance, a capacity to contest the unfettered use of the maritime approaches to Canada would be pursued energetically, but the acquisition of a capability to support the United States in a forward strategy aimed at the defeat of Soviet SSBNs in their protected sanctuaries would be foregone.

If such a vigilant but 'pre-war' doctrine were developed, it is then possible that the choice between continental and European commitments could be reconciled without requiring unrealistic increases in the Canadian defence budget. A 'pre-war' doctrine would also meet the requirements of Canadian sovereignty, but leave open the issues that would be raised if future US developments pointed towards large-scale US deployments in