to manage its enemies. Thus, maintaining South Africa's nuclear program in a position of "deep latency" is adequate for its long term contingencies, e.g., to mobilize Western attentiveness to South African concerns.

To forecast nuclear proliferation in the 1980s three questions should be considered. First, where is a near-nuclear state "at" at present in its nuclear capability? Second, where is a near-nuclear state "at" at present in its overt nuclear policy and posture? Third, what is the overt pattern of, and process in, the development of a near-nuclear power's capability and policy in its conduct in the four types of policy situations — non-crisis, pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis? Our answers are tentative, but serve as explanations of past developments and they provide a basis for forecasting the future.

India. It has possessed the capability to introduce nuclear weaponry into the Indian subcontinent since the mid-1960s — if by "introduction" is meant (a) producing a nuclear device or weapon; (b) testing it; and (c) the government officially advocating a nuclear weapons policy. The pattern and the process of Indian nuclear policy development was first, to come close to making the bomb (late 1965 — early 1966); and second, then to move away from that position; and third, then to decide to test in 1974. A common factor in the first and third was the attentiveness of Indian leadership to the implications of military crises in South Asia (the wars in 1965 and in 1971) that required militarization of nuclear policy in response to these crises. Thus, Indian nuclear decision-making can be classed as post-crisis" that fuses into the "non-crisis" category also. Then, having crossed the fourth threshold in the proliferation ladder, the pattern and process was to revert to a mode of "latency"; thus, the curtain was re-closed after 1974. In short, India's nuclear behavior demonstrated two basic movements: the first was towards nuclear testing; the second was to move away from nuclear testing. Underlying both movements was a constant reinforcement of the first and second steps in the proliferation scale.

Pakistan. It may have been able to explode a device as early as 1973; but more surely by 1979 (when speculation was rife about the activities of Dr. Khan and his famous enrichment project). The appearances were a deep commitment to nuclear power and quick activity to catch up with India, to build the Islamic bomb, to "beg, borrow or steal" (in the words of General Zia). However, Pakistan seems to be experiencing problems with its enrichment project as well as with the reprocessing project. The wear and tear of the centrifuges is high, replacement is costly (but possible) and plutonium fuel fabrication may be problematic. So at best Pakistan could explode a bomb, but could it, at present, mount a viable nuclear force? Probably not.

The pattern and the process of Pakistani nuclear development was twofold. First, to build a real nuclear infrastructure after the Multan meeting in January 1972, when Z.A. Bhutto gave his experts three years to build the "Islamic bomb." The development of its nuclear infrastructure is significant even though the three-year deadline has long passed. Second, to exploit the image of momentum in Pakistan's nuclear policy and capability to acquire conventional US armaments for national security. (This was Bhutto's aim before the USSR invaded Afghanistan.) US disinformation promoted the Pakistan bomb story in order to persuade India to accept full-scope safeguards in return for international controls on Pakistan's nuclear development. The bluff failed.

Israel. According to *The New York Times* and US intelligence sources, through the 1960s and 1970s Israel either possessed nuclear arms or had the capability to go nuclear in a short time. Israel appears to have crossed the