

3. Such a formula would have to meet certain basic criteria:

*For the USA:* (1) eliminate any threat that Cuba will become a Soviet pawn in the cold war game of power chess either (a) as a Soviet military base directed against the USA (b) as an agent of direct military intervention in other Latin-American countries or (c) as a staging point for the transmission of Soviet arms to revolutionary elements in other Latin-American countries;

(2) provide for an iron-clad system of guarantee, their supervision and control, the breach of which would permit the application by the Inter-American community of sanctions or even direct military action which could not be interpreted as a violation of the principle of non-intervention.

*For Cuba:* (1) eradicate all fear of USA armed intervention either direct or in support of a counter-revolutionary movement in Cuba;

(2) offer some relief from the economic warfare launched by the USA (in the form, possibly, of a USA undertaking not to press other countries to apply economic sanctions).

*For Latin America:* be such as to command the unanimous support of the Inter-American system.

4. No doubt there would be more than one way to attain these objectives, but a possible approach to the problem might consist of the following:

(1) Both the USA and Cuban governments might be asked to give formal pledges to the nations of the hemisphere that they will not intervene directly or indirectly in the internal affairs of any American nation. The pledges would be delivered in a form and context to meet, in as specific terms as possible, USA criteria 1 (b) and (c) and Cuban criterion 1, mentioned above.

(2) In the light of the USA undertaking regarding non-intervention which should largely remove justification for a continuing build-up of military power in Cuba, the Cuban Government would be asked in return to halt its acquisition of armaments and submit to an arms ceiling based on present levels.

(3) In order to recoup their badly damaged prestige in Latin America, the USA should be encouraged to make, with a view to creating a great psychological impact in Latin America, a bold move regarding the Guantánamo base. We all know that any number of military expert opinions will be marshalled to prove that the base is absolutely essential to the fulfilment of USA strategic obligations. These expert opinions, however, will never appear too convincing in the face of the fact that the USA could easily have a base offering comparable advantages only a few hundred miles away on the Florida coast. If therefore, the Americans are genuinely interested in preventing a further military build-up in Cuba, their agreeing to enter into negotiations with Cuba over the future of the base, would seem to be a relatively small price to pay in order to induce the Cuban Government to neutralize itself as a military or para-military force in the hemisphere. It also seems evident that while at this stage Guantánamo is still negotiable, it may not remain so for a very long time. Castro might at any moment see fit to make impossible demands in this regard from which he will not be able to back away, thus rendering negotiations impossible.

One USA initiative might consist of offering to negotiate in two or three years time a new status for Guantánamo permitting far greater Cuban participation in the operations of the base along the lines of the arrangements made with Iceland with respect to the USA base in that country. Another might be an offer to withdraw from the base over a stated period of time and the conversion of its facilities (if this is in any way feasible) to serve a non-military purpose and which the Cubans would be allowed to acquire at an agreed cost.