

disarmament, to apply sanctions against Italy, and to offer to act against Germany at the time of Munich.

By 1939 Moscow clearly judged the effort to contain Germany as a failure. Soviet foreign policy began to merge with Soviet defence policy and Moscow began to substitute concrete strategic action for the dubious manoeuvres of diplomacy. After weeks of bargaining, it proved to be Germany, and not the Western allies, which was prepared to give the Soviet strategist that which he considered essential to the survival of the U.S.S.R., namely, a free hand to organize the defence of the western border from the Baltic to the Black seas. The Nazi-Soviet Pact and the subsequent Soviet military expansion into Eastern Europe were typical of a desperate political machine which was accustomed to total solutions to crucial problems.

A full picture of Soviet policy during the Second World War has yet to be blocked in, but certain important outlines seem to emerge from the materials now available. Until 1943, Soviet thinking seems to have concentrated on the expulsion of German troops from Soviet soil; even until 1945, the war remained for the U.S.S.R. an essentially European campaign, although, for the West, it had become a properly global struggle with the entry of the U.S.A. some four years before. The Soviet Government seems to have made no serious effort to join the Combined Chiefs of Staff to influence the course of the war in non-European theatres, or to sway strategic decisions which might have influenced the shape of the post-war world. Even as regards the European theatre, Soviet energies seem to have been concentrated on securing early Allied intervention behind the Nazi-Soviet front; strangely enough, Moscow is not known to have expressed any preference for intervention in the north-west to an attack on the "soft under-belly" of the European peninsula, and, as late as 1944, Stalin even agreed on the desirability of an assault at the head of the Adriatic. If Moscow had hopes of extending its power west of Germany, these hopes do not seem to have conditioned its strategic thinking. The closing months of the war show no sign of any imaginative initiative on the part of Moscow, and the burden of post-war planning was surrendered to the U.S.A. and the U.K. The bulk of Soviet energy was devoted to applying a formula to the former enemy states which would yield a maximum contribution to the rehabilitation of the U.S.S.R. As for Germany, it is very doubtful that Moscow could see beyond partition, the solution which had been vaguely foreseen by Stalin in 1941. But it is not clear that Moscow even accepted the need to drive west into Germany until late in 1942, and, even then, in the following year, Stalin left Eden with the impression that he would fear a communist Germany. As for Eastern Europe, however, 1943 brought the creation of puppet governments which were to move west in the wake of the Red Army: Moscow had clearly begun to prepare a permanent, i.e., total solution to her western border problem. In the Far East it applied a similar formula in Korea, but was naively content to leave Manchuria to the Chinese Communists. If Moscow ever expected to reach Tokyo, which is doubtful, it is almost certain that it had not yet worked out a plan for Japan when the latter capitulated. Meanwhile, the whole Soviet approach to global order was, to put it mildly, extremely *borné*: Moscow could not think in terms greater than rule by the Big Four, and of a veto to protect her national interests.

Since 1945, the Soviet leadership has seen itself as confronted with a greater Western threat than ever before, and it has increased its efforts in the direct and single-minded pursuit of Soviet security. The basic formula is extraordinarily simple, for Moscow has been seeking the most perfect possible disengagement with the West, and it is extraordinarily crude, for it has been conceived in typically maximal terms. The U.S.S.R. began to apply this formula in Eastern Europe by the expulsion of Western interests from the region. When the West reacted with the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and NATO, the