

The Korean conflict had perhaps its greatest impact on Canada's attitude towards its North Atlantic Treaty obligations (Chapter 5) and its relations with the United States (Chapter 8). It gave rise to the fear that a Soviet offensive in Western Europe was imminent and ended Ottawa's traditional reluctance to invest its scarce resources in peace-time military preparedness. In July and August, American pressure helped convince the Cabinet to increase Canadian defence expenditures substantially. As North America and Western Europe hurried to rearm, Canada's efforts to supply its North Atlantic allies with mutual aid — diffident in early 1950 — became an enormous \$300-million program. By September 1950, with the new alliance already straining under the weight of the crisis over the decision to re-arm West Germany, the government agreed to send Canadian troops back to Europe as part of the new North Atlantic integrated force. "For those who assumed that participation in international institutions was going to be cheap," John Holmes recalled later, "1950 was a bad year."⁶

Most of the material on Canada's relations with the United States should also be read with one eye on the conflict in Korea and its wide-ranging consequences. While Chapter 8 devotes some attention to such traditional "fence-line" issues as the Niagara Diversion Treaty and fisheries management, substantial space is given over to the consideration of bilateral defence questions, which loomed larger than ever after June 1950. The difficult and awkward negotiations over defence procurement in early 1950 contrast strikingly with the rapid pace of military and economic integration that resulted when the United States — with Canada forced to follow closely behind — moved towards partial mobilization in the fall of 1950.

The new sense of urgency which infused Canada's defence relations with the United States propelled the government's concern for Canadian sovereignty to new heights. Washington's inclination to view its neighbour's northern reaches as increasingly vital for the defence of North America led to a growing requirement for bases and facilities. In acceding to the U.S. request to station a squadron of nuclear-armed B-49s at Goose Bay in August 1950, Canada was confronted for the first time with troubling questions about its role and responsibilities in any American decision to deploy nuclear weapons from Canadian territory. This issue complicated bilateral relations for the rest of the decade.

As the Cold War entered a chillier period, other bilateral relationships paled in significance compared with the importance of Canada's relations with the United States. Indeed, the unexpected expenditures necessitated by the Korean crisis prompted Ottawa to suspend plans for opening new posts abroad, accounting for the brevity of the first chapter. Instead of the usual collection of documents on recognition and accreditation, this section has as its central preoccupation the impact of the Cold War on the conduct of diplomacy.

Similarly, the Cold War effectively eliminated significant bilateral exchanges with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (Chapter 10). Isolated in his chancery, Canada's chargé d'affaires, John Watkins, even found it impossible to comment meaningfully on the nature and course of Soviet foreign policy. Relations with the

⁶ John Holmes, *The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order, 1943-1957, Volume 2* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982), p. 176.