of Beli. Therefore, in the two first lectures I have stated my reasons for dissatisfaction with the various attempts which have been made to base religion upon authority.

Granting that religion can find no eal support in external authority, we are obviously under compulsion either to abandon all systematic thought in this region, or to rebuild our theological beliefs on the basis of reason. I have therefore attempted to deal with this question, in a general way, in the third and fourth lectures, which consist of an exposition of the Criti- I solution of the problem and the outline of an alism developed out of it by a firm application of the principle that the world is rational and is capable of being comprehended by us in virtue of the rationality which is our deeper and truest nature.

Having reached his point, we are met by two opposite philosophical schools of thought, which refuse to accept the solution of the problem thus advanced, or perhaps rather of what they mistakenly regard as that solution. In the fourth lecture will be found my reasons for rejecting both of these views,—the former because it virtually abolishes the rationality of the whole, the latter because it ignores the rationality of the parts.

So far the discussion has proceeded on the principle that a philosophy of religion is possible. There is, however, a very active school of thinkers who are averse to any philosophy of religion, or at least to any that claims to provide more than a working conception of life.