This power of regulation appears to us to have been pure in its principle, simple in its operation, and falutary in its effects. But for fome time past we have observed, with pain, that it hath been turned to other purposes, than it was originally defigned for, and recaining its title, hath become an engine of intolerable op-The argupressions and grievous taxations. ment of an eminent judge, states the point in a fimilar case strongly for us, in these words.— "Though it be granted, that the king hath the custody of the bavens and ports of this island, being the very gates of this kingdom, and is trusted. with the keys of these gates; yet the inference and argument thereupon made, I utterly deny. For in it there is mutatio bypothesis, and a transition from a thing of one nature to another; as the premiles are of a power only fiduciary, and in point of trust and government, and the conclusion infers a right of interest and gain. Admit the king has custodiam portuum, yet he hath but the custody, which is a trust and not dominium utile. hath power to open and shut, upon considera-TION OF PUBLIC GOOD TO THE PEOPLE AND STATE. but not to make gain and benefit by it: the one is PACTECTION, the other is EXPILATION." By comon law the king may restrain a subject from going abroad, or enjoin him by his chancellor from proceeding at law: But to conclude, that he may therefore take money, not to restrain or not to enjoin, is to sell government, trust, AND COMMON JUSTICE *.

· Rights of the people, as to impositions.