

some writers, as identical with the will, or where as with others, desire is at least included under the term will, because an element essential to every volition, the principle might indeed be explained in a sense comparatively harmless; but where, as is usually the case, the will is regarded as a distinct faculty, and by what is voluntary is understood acts or decisions or the products of such acts or decisions of the will, the principle we deem to be as dangerous as it is unsound. The simplest and most spontaneous, and most involuntary affection toward, or desire for, what is morally evil, we hold to be itself morally evil and culpable,—nay, to be the very root and germ of all sin in the heart. The simplest rising of such a feeling in the heart,—as for instance, of enmity or hatred to God, or of the desire to escape the restraints of His law,—however speedily it may sink to rest under the rebuke of conscience, and although the only act of volition which may have taken place in connection with it, may have been an act directed to its suppression,—must, we conceive, be regarded as rendering a man criminal before God. Deny this, and you just deny, that the germ of sin is sin; and that that is evil and culpable, without which there would not, and could not be, an evil act of will.

And irrespective, therefore, of all reference to the will, if we have succeeded in showing, that a moral element is always involved in belief on moral and religious subjects, we would hold that man's responsibility for his belief has been established. But we think it can be shown, that the will is concerned in belief.

2. In order, however, to our illustration of this point, it will be of use here to refer to a distinction which is sometimes attempted to be drawn by the advocates of man's non-responsibility. It is the distinction between, man's responsibility for his mode of dealing with evidence, and his responsibility for belief itself. By some, his responsibility in the former case is admitted, while in respect of the latter, it is denied. And as undoubtedly the will is, if not chiefly, at least most palpably concerned in the treatment of evidence, a neglect to dispose of this distinction, might weaken the force of our proof.

Now we maintain, that we cannot thus dis sever, the dealing with the evidence on which belief must rest, from the belief itself. The one is an essential preliminary to the other; they are related as cause and effect; and the moral character which attaches to the former, must necessarily attach to the latter. Thus if an individual's dishonest

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