

*Supply—National Defence*

according to schedule though he is not quite sure, nor are we, what is the schedule. Why not have waited for a short time until this particular matter was cleared up? Canada has scrapped its own plane, the CF-105, for this unproven United States missile now so bitterly controversial in the United States. Even the minister, though he appeared very confident about the effectiveness and value of this missile in the references he made to it in the house, seems to have had some second thoughts. In a press interview in Winnipeg on June 5—the minister will correct me if this is not an accurate account of what he said—the minister is reported to have stated that the government will await the results of United States tests before a final decision is made on the Bomarc.

Does that mean that no final decision has yet been made? Is that the present situation? If so, is it not a fact that the construction of the bases has begun tying us up closely to the whole Bomarc-SAGE system? It means that we are tied not only to the Bomarc system but to the whole SAGE complex, because SAGE is certainly essential to Bomarc.

As to the main argument advanced in favour of Bomarc, it is perhaps not one which has a broad Canadian appeal. The argument is that it has a longer range than Nike-Hercules or Nike-Ajax and could push the area of effective defence north of the United States border. That apparently is the tactic to be followed by NORAD, as General Partridge made perfectly clear to the house committee on February 19 at page 336 of the evidence, in these words:

The interceptors which take off for interception purposes are fully armed and ready to fight.

This would apply to missiles too, apparently. I continue:

We want to start the battle as far out from our targets as we can and put on increasing pressure by increased numbers of interceptors as the battle moves in toward our target areas. If we do not destroy the enemy before he gets to these target areas, we want to apply surface to air missiles against him.

And again on the same day, in terms which apply to the missile and the manned interceptor, General Partridge had this to say:

We would like very much if it were possible to do so to fight the air battle far out from our targets over uninhabited areas of northern Canada or out at sea—

We want to engage the attacking forces as far out from the targets as we can and break up the bomber stream, shoot down as many of the enemy airplanes as we can and get to them before they can launch air to surface missiles. Then we would like to take them under fire by Bomarc if this is possible, again offshore or in relatively uninhabited areas of Canada.

I suggest that the effectiveness of this kind of defence, which I think is becoming

increasingly dubious at best, will depend on a good alert or early warning system, and this effectiveness should not display itself in a form which would mean that the battle would be fought, if it ever had to be fought, over Canadian populated territory. I agree that it should be pushed, not over the United States border but far north of the Canadian border, if this kind of defence is to be adopted.

If it is going to work at all—and the minister did not have very much to say about this in his statement this morning—we have to have an effective early warning system designed to take care of these new developments. The minister will correct me if I am wrong, but I understand that the early warning system we now have is adequate protection against bombers provided there is no jamming, and that is quite a proviso. For missiles, there is no early warning system available at all, but billions of dollars are going to be spent to secure one through the ballistic early warning system, in order to achieve how much warning? From 15 to 20 minutes.

About this new development and the accompanying expenditure, a gentleman who is probably the greatest radar authority in the world today, a man to whom the free world should be eternally grateful, Sir Robert Watson-Watt, is very sceptical indeed. As he stated in Washington the other day he is pessimistic about the effectiveness of early warning systems for missiles and the wisdom of spending these billions on them. I am in no position, of course, to judge whether what I am about to read is an accurate and reasoned assessment of the situation, but certainly anything this man says is worthy of attention. A couple of weeks ago he is reported to have said:

The heavy expenditures you are devoting to SAGE systems; BMEWS in the north, and the Nike-Zeus anti-missile missile, is a rather forlorn effort to jack up radar to levels it won't reach.

Let us hope he is not correct in this. He went on to say that improvements contemplated in the D.E.W. line BMEWS are—and I quote his words—

—at best a very expensive way to get a still inadequate warning.

Our anxieties and preoccupations about this are increased by General Partridge's statement before the house committee—and perhaps the minister could comment on this—when he said:

The Russians could jam the D.E.W. and mid-Canada lines if they wished to do so.

If this form of continental defence, this system of early warning, interception and destruction has a valid purpose—and let us assume it has a valid purpose—that purpose