

from current voting patterns as it has in recent years. We urge that new appointments correct this distortion.

We do not suggest any formal consultative procedure for the appointment of future senators, but we believe that such informal consultation with politicians and other community leaders as has been customary in the past should be continued and, preferably, broadened.

The *Constitution Act, 1867* requires that those appointed to the Senate have assets totalling at least \$4,000. The original purpose of this requirement is no longer valid, and the property qualification is now anachronistic. The requirement should be removed by a constitutional amendment under section 44 of the *Constitution Act, 1982*.

Witnesses have pointed out that most of the work of the Senate is carried out by a minority of its present members. It was also suggested that being a senator should be a full-time job. Several witnesses argued that attendance rules and conflict of interest guidelines should be strengthened, and that there should be pension arrangements for senators comparable to those available to other parliamentarians. We see merit in these suggestions and propose that a special committee of the Senate be established to consider the issues and make recommendations. Such recommendations would apply to senators who are appointed. Upon introduction of an elected Senate, the rules and guidelines should be reviewed.

Powers of an appointed Senate

At present, the Senate has powers equivalent to those of the House of Commons, except with regard to money bills and constitutional amendments. Although a money bill can be rejected by the Senate, it cannot be introduced in the Senate. Constitutional amendments require the assent of the House of Commons, but the Senate's assent is not required if the House re-passes the relevant resolution after a lapse of 180 days following its first passage. The Senate therefore has only a suspensive veto over constitutional amendments.

With the exception of constitutional amendments, the Senate's consent is required before any bill, including a money bill, can become law. This requirement is commonly called the Senate's absolute veto. We have already noted that the Senate has been increasingly unwilling to use that veto. Many people have suggested, however, that an appointed Senate would feel less inhibited about using a suspensive veto, and that if it did, senators would be able to play a more important and useful role in their review of legislation emanating from the House of Commons.

We agree that a suspensive veto would be a more suitable instrument in the hands of an appointed Senate than an absolute veto, and would probably be used. We also believe that the availability and occasional use of such a veto would help to facilitate the transition from an appointed Senate to an elected Senate, where a suspensive veto is likely to be used more readily.