

betrayal of the communist cause; he calls it revisionism, and to him it is a profound shock that this should happen in the land of Lenin, and a profound warning that this could happen inside China for his own revolution.

Mao, at different times since 1949, has been more or less in the ascendancy in China. We do not know the full details; we may never know. At times he seems to have been rather elevated to a position where he was not taking very much of a direct interest in internal developments, but from 1963 to the present time there were a series of political campaigns—I watched them building up in 1964 and 1965 when I was in Peking—under the omnibus title of the Socialist Education Movement, which were the direct forerunners of what is now called the Great Cultural Revolution. These campaigns bear the imprint of Mao; they bear his ideas; they follow the tactics he has always followed. I think he was very much the driving force behind them. With these campaigns, and now with the Great Cultural Revolution, Mao aims at a thorough purge, as we would call it, or rectification, as he would call it, of the communist party, of the government bureaucracy, and of the People's Liberation Army. At the same time, and co-related to this, it aims at a disciplining of all intellectuals, bureaucrats, young people especially, a tempering of them through physical labour and a disciplining of them ideologically. A tremendous effort is being made to ensure that they have only the correct and most pure ideas.

Behind all this, the ultimate aim—and this is publicly acknowledged in the Maoist press—is to recreate Chinese society; and not only that, but to change the very nature of Chinese Man, specifically to abolish the distinctions between town and country, and between mental and manual labour, to evolve a truly classless society; and specifically too, to make every Chinese at the same time a worker, a peasant, a soldier, and an intellectual, capable of handling all the duties involved in those four designations. This strikes most of us, I think, as wildly impractical and visionary, and some people would say, and have said, quite mad. I regard it personally as impractical and visionary, but not mad. I do not think this is the mad futuristic dream of a senile dictator, for two reasons. First, it is typical of Mao's romantic approach to revolution, the approach he has always consistently followed; what he is doing today is thoroughly consistent with what he has been doing ever since he had his first revolutionary base in the late 1920s. Rather than thinking of it as some wild dream put into the future, I think it is more useful to realize that Mao is trying to recreate something he originally had; he is trying to recreate what he had in the revolutionary base areas in the 1930s and 1940s, especially the base of Yanan in the north west of China, from which, with a handful of dedicated supporters, Mao launched and continued the final campaigns of the revolution which defeated first, both the Japanese in his area, and finally defeated the vastly superior armies of Chiang Kai-Shek. Mao is trying deliberately to go back in time to **these most glorious days of his revolution** and to recreate the sort of situation he had then, when, in fact, literally everybody of his most dedicated supporters was a worker, a peasant, a soldier and an intellectual. You had to be all these things because otherwise you would not survive.

In the month of September 1965, Mao lost the majority support in the party for this program. There are fascinating speculations, but we do not know the details. We do know now that his opposition includes such extremely senior people as the Chinese head of state, Liu Shao-chi, who, until last autumn, was Mao's chosen successor, and just as significant, the very powerful secretary