is nevertheless an enormous improvement over the situation that existed before January 28. To begin with, American and Vietnamese prisoners of war are being released. Shortly the last USA forces in Viet-Nam will have departed. The ICCS has had ita role to play in these developments and if it did nothing else this would have justified its existence. In addition, the four parties are in contact and, perhape more important, 80 are the two South Vietnamese parties, not only in Saigon and other areas but, more importantly, at the political level in Paris. The Agreement as it has been carried out falls short of what we desired, although I not at this stage prepared to say by how much or how this short-fall will affect further Canadian participation. The facts as I have given them to you are now being studied by my colleagues and myself and we will very shortly be bringing our decision to Parliement for consideration. I hope that by now no one in this country or elsewhere is under the impression that it is our function to bring peace to Viet-Nam. Many have tried, but it is now clear beyond doubt that only the Vietnamese themselves can establish peace in their troubled country.

I should also mention that in all three countries that $I$ visited I informed the Goverment leaders I met of Canada's willingness to provide economic development assistance and that we would be prepared to discuss the modalities, including the question of bilateral and multilateral assiatance at any time they considered convenient. In all three capitals my interlocutors agreed to pursue this matter with us at a mutually convenient time.

I would not like to conclude this sumary of my tour without mentioning the kindness and hospitality with which we were met by the governments in Saigon, in Laos and in Hanoi. The warmth of the welcome made it clear that whatever our positions in respect of the role of the ICCS might be, in bilateral terms Canada is well regarded by the statesmen with whom I spoke.

