

### 3.0 POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING AN OUTER SPACE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT

#### 3.1 Introduction

In constructing a politically plausible scenario for the operation of a Paxsat A system, two connected sets of issues must be addressed. Taken together, these issues and their implications form the general context which will determine the degree to which the operation of a Paxsat system is both plausible and valuable in arms control terms. These issues also have specific implications for whatever criteria of technical 'sufficiency' are to be applied in defining and evaluating the operational parameters of a Paxsat system.

The first set of issues concerns the 'participatory status' of an arms control agreement relating to the weaponization of outer space. In particular, will the arms limitation regime which Paxsat will assist in verifying be bilateral (US-Soviet) or multilateral in nature? In other words, what role can be envisioned for non-superpower states? This question may, in turn, be broken into two component parts:

- (a) The participatory status of the negotiations process (bilateral versus multilateral).
- (b) The nature of the resulting agreement, (bilateral versus multilateral) and the degree, if any, of multilateral involvement in the administration of the agreement, including its verification and compliance provisions.

The second set of issues concerns the precise nature of the treaty administration and verification regime associated with an outer space arms control agreement. In particular, what purpose could a Paxsat system serve in constituting or contributing to the verification requirements or provisions of a plausible accord, and what standards, if any, can be identified to assist in defining verification 'sufficiency' for Paxsat? And lastly, should a credible verification role be identified for Paxsat, what general operational parameters can be identified which might serve as the